GHANAIAN AGENCY IN DEMOCRATIZATION: EXAMINING DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN U.S.-GHANA RELATIONS AFTER THE COLD WAR, 1992-2001 by Awinsong, Win A 1988-
  
 
 
 
GHANAIAN AGENCY IN DEMOCRATIZATION: EXAMINING DEMOCRACY 
PROMOTION IN U.S.-GHANA RELATIONS AFTER THE COLD WAR, 1992-2001 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to the  
College of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
For the Degree of Master of Arts  
In the Department of History  
University of Saskatchewan 
Saskatoon 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
MOSES ALLOR AWINSONG 
 
 
 
© Copyright Moses Allor Awinsong, August 2019. All rights reserved 
 
 
i 
  
PERMISSION TO USE 
 
In presenting this thesis/dissertation in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a 
Postgraduate degree from the University of Saskatchewan, I agree that the Libraries of 
this University may make it freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission 
for copying of this thesis/dissertation in any manner, in whole or in part, for scholarly 
purposes may be granted by the professor or professors who supervised my 
thesis/dissertation work or, in their absence, by the Head of the Department or the Dean 
of the College in which my thesis work was done. It is understood that any copying or 
publication or use of this thesis/dissertation or parts thereof for financial gain shall not be 
allowed without my written permission. It is also understood that due recognition shall be 
given to me and to the University of Saskatchewan in any scholarly use which may be 
made of any material in my thesis/dissertation.  
Requests for permission to copy or to make other uses of materials in this 
thesis/dissertation in whole or part should be addressed to: 
 Head of the Department of History 
 619 Arts Building,  
9 Campus Drive, 
 University of Saskatchewan 
 Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, S7N 5A5, Canada 
 
 OR 
 
 Dean 
 College of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies 
 University of Saskatchewan 
 116 Thorvaldson Building, 110 Science Place 
 Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, S7N 5C9  Canada 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
  
ABSTRACT 
This study examines the impact of U.S. aid on democratization in the post-Soviet 
world. It sheds light on how the U.S., emboldened by its new position as the world’s 
main superpower, promoted democratization, particularly the U.S. form of democracy, as 
a normative value throughout the developing world. More specifically, I explore the ways 
that the promotion of democracy in Africa was construed and even, challenged, through 
local democratizing efforts, civil society action and popular participation. Utilizing a case 
study approach, this work analyzes the impact of domestic ideology on American foreign 
aid policy in Ghana after 1990 and how the Ghanaian people and leadership understood 
democratization, its promotion and their relationship with external agents promoting the 
adoption of democracy. More importantly, the project argues that foreign assistance 
programmes for democratization in Ghana were not the main drivers for democracy. 
Ghanaian demands and activities to promote democracy as an alternative to one-man rule 
played significant roles in the transition to the rule of law in Ghana.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The rise of the modern nation-state enlarged state-to-state relations, which in turn 
affected a host of social, political, cultural and economic factors in international relations. 
Hans Morgenthau, the mid-twentieth century American political scientist, explains how 
the emergence of modern diplomacy in European politics from the Enlightenment 
onwards made structural level political relations more engaging.1 A marker of that 
change in diplomacy was the embedding of the idea of resident consulates in inter-state 
relations.2 For this reason, host states worked hard to gain the trust of guest envoys as a 
means to better relations with the sending states. European governments hosting envoys 
or ambassadors from other European powers sometimes provided subsidies to the 
resident envoys to gain their support in advocating their positions to the envoy’s home 
government.3   
 In the 20th century, the new diplomacy Morgenthau espoused deepened as 
technology and historical changes birthed new relations among states. During the Cold 
War, some wealthy states used material resources and technology to court the favour of 
 
1 Hans Morgenthau, “A Political Theory of Foreign Aid,” American Political Science Review 56, no. 2 
(June 1962): 301–9, https://doi.org/10.2307/1952366.  
2 Resident consulates are permanent, physical presences of foreign states in other countries usually 
represented by an ambassador or envoy.  
3 Morgenthau provides one of the early theoretical basis for aid in U.S foreign policy in the post-World 
War II era when the U.S. entered preeminence as leader of the West. He emphasizes aid as a likely tool for 
realist politicking on the international stage by U.S policymakers. This tradition is traced to Austrian and 
French subsidy schemes for envoys during the 18th century. He relates how, for instance, Austrian 
Chancellor Klemens von Metternich received secret subsidies from the French government to advocate for 
French interests in Austrian courts. In the Twentieth Century, subsidies found an overt place in official 
diplomatic cycles in international affairs. See Morgenthau, “A Political Theory of Foreign Aid.” 
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less endowed states. Most of these recipient states were developing countries.4 As a 
superpower, the United States made use of this instrument of action to try to expropriate 
policy concessions from its allies and draw hostile forces closer to its position and 
interests. Though Britain and the Nordic states, namely Sweden, Norway, Finland and 
Denmark, as well as other wealthy industrialized nations, were engaged in what one 
might call 'the business of benevolence' to other countries, the scale of U.S. foreign aid 
outweighed all other countries.5  
The project sheds light on how the U.S., emboldened by its new position as the 
world’s main superpower in the post-Cold War era, promoted democratization, 
particularly the U.S. form of democracy, as a normative value throughout the developing 
world including Ghana. Also, I explore the ways in which the Ghanaian people- civil 
society groups, community leaders, young people - construed and challenged the U.S. 
democracy advancement campaign. Utilizing a case study approach, this work offers 
understanding of the impact of domestic ideology on American foreign aid policy in 
Ghana after 1990 as well the receptivity of the Ghanaian people to the inimitable ways 
Americans crafted democracy promotion. This project argues that local forces led, 
shaped, and executed the Ghanaian democratization agenda in the 1990s with limited 
assistance from foreign donor agencies. To ascribe democratization to the ingenuity of 
 
4 These were states with low economic growth, political cohesion or technological power. For a detailed 
review, see Moses Allor Awinsong, “The Power of the Periphery: Aid, Mutuality and Cold War U.S-Ghana 
Relations, 1957-1966,” Eastern Illinois University, (Master's Thesis, No: 3323), 2017, chap. 1.  
5 J. Bradford De Long and Barry Eichengreen, “The Marshall Plan: History’s Most Successful Structural 
Adjustment Program,” Working Paper (National Bureau of Economic Research, November 1991), 
https://doi.org/10.3386/w3899. Aid was considered benevolent because there was no expectation of pay 
back. Many Western donors did not measure the returns for their aid in merely physical terms. Rather, there 
was an expectation of subtle or overt support for Western causes in world politics during the Cold War. 
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democracy aid givers or Washington policy makers is to deny the agency of local 
democratizing forces in aid recipient states like Ghana.  
The understanding of democracy used here includes, in the words of Gerardo 
Munck, “values of political freedom and political equality.”6 This understanding includes 
elections and institutional provisions and guarantees of individual liberty that enable 
citizens to partake in political decision-making as well as support the continuing 
enhancement of social and political environments for citizen participation in governance. 
Similarly, Giovanni Sartori provides three pillars on which democracy stands: a) 
constitutional structures and processes, b) electoral and voting arenas, and c) society at 
large.7 Based on these postulations, democracy is genuine when power holders use 
legitimate, elective processes to come to power. Citizens must be able to demand answers 
from elected leaders for certain decisions as well as partake in the decision-making 
process. The use of the term democracy in this work implies both the politics of the 
transition and some elements of post-transition politics in Ghana.  
The rule of law is a concept that essentializes individual liberty and the 
constitutional procedures and processes necessary to assure those liberties.8 It is an 
important measure of the quality of democracy because it emphasizes the centrality of 
law over rule by persons in determining the legitimacy of the state in requiring 
obligations from individuals. For Richard Bellamy, the checks and balances inherent in a 
state’s constitutional arrangements provide the most extensive, broad and potent 
 
6 Gerardo L. Munck, What is democracy? A reconceptualization of the quality of democracy, 
Democratization, 23:1, (2016), 1-26, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2014.918104. 
7 Giovanni Sartori, “The Tyranny of the Majority.” In Democracy: A Reader, Edited by Ricardo Blag, page 
192. Second Edition, New York City, Columbia University Press (2001). 
8 Richard Bellamy and Andrew Mason, Political Concepts, Ed., (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2003). 
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inhibition to the exercise of arbitrary executive power.9 He thus concludes that the rule of 
law, understood in the institutional arrangements of organs of government in 
democracies, works to strengthen individual freedoms by keeping each branch in check. 
Thomas Paine also made the popular observation that “in absolute governments the king 
is law, so in free countries the law ought to be king; and there ought to be no other.”10  
But, under what legitimate basis would citizens challenge unreasonable demands 
for abeyance to law by the state? To resolve this problem, Aristotle opined that arbitrary 
exercise of power is avoidable when “rightly constituted law should be the final 
sovereign; and personal rule…should be sovereign only on those matters on which law is 
unable, owning to the difficulty of framing general rules for all contingencies, to make an 
exact pronouncement.”11 The rule of law is therefore grounded on two foundations. 
Firstly, there are the checks and balances and the separation of powers inherent in power 
arrangements among organs of government which prevent arbitrary exercise of state 
power by any one organ. Secondly, the rule of law entails devotion to the rules defining 
individuals’ relations with others and the state. In this sense, it implies the strict use of 
procedures to protect citizens’ liberties individually or collectively. Both considerations 
of the rule of law are employed in this project to explain the consolidation of democracy 
in Ghana in the post-Cold War period.  
 
 
9Richard Bellamy, “The Rule of Law,” In Political Concepts, Ed. Richard Bellamy and Andrew Mason, 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003). 
10 Thomas Paine, “Common Sense”, in Nelson F. Adkins, ed, Common Sense and Other Political Writings 
3, 32 (Liberal Arts, 1953).  
11 Ernest Barker, The Politics of Aristotle, Book 3 (Translated), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), 
Chapter 11: 19. 
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Study Background 
 A notable aid initiative after 1945 that launched Washington as a global economic 
power was the Marshall Plan. Probably the most ambitious international subsidy program 
in the past century, the Marshall Plan, formally the European Recovery Program (ERP), 
facilitated Western European rebuilding after the Second World War. It announced the 
U.S. as a major aid giver to the world and created opportunities for “infinite possibilities 
of influencing the policies, attitudes and actions of other countries by statesmanship in 
Washington.”12 Michael Hogan, a historian of U.S. foreign relations, considers the 
Marshall Plan as America's “search for a new economic order at home and abroad” after 
1945.13 The plan helped “restructure the world economy” in ways synonymous to the 
“corporativist” economy of the U.S. which prioritized private enterprise and a capitalist 
led growth more so than the state-led recovery pursued in socialist domains in the East.14 
The Marshall Plan was therefore a combination of capitalist interests, humanitarianism, 
and Washington's political vision, creating for the U.S. much needed moral, political and 
economic capital in the ensuing Cold War.15 According to historians and scholars, the 
plan exemplified the capacity of aid to facilitate U.S. national interests globally and to 
support other states' transitions from poverty, destruction and underdevelopment to 
 
12 Joseph Marion Jones, The Fifteen Weeks: February 21-June 5, 1947, vol. 47 (Harcourt, 1955), 262-63.  
13 Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 
1947-1952 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 2.  
14 Hogan, The Marshall Plan, 3. 
15 The U.S. understood that control of the global economic structure would position it for a more expansive 
role in world affairs in a way that would displace the old powers. This foresight helped provide the 
foundation for the broad external policies of the U.S. after 1945. See Geir Lundestad, “Empire by 
Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952,” Journal of Peace Research 23, no. 3 
(September 1, 1986): 263–77, https://doi.org/10.1177/002234338602300305.  
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wealth and progress.16 Eventually, the plan, though an Europe first policy, was replicated 
in Asia and Africa on smaller scales with the conviction that it would lift economically 
needy nations from poverty and expand their access to the benefits conferred on 
humanity by democracy, capitalist-led economics, and technology. The struggle to sell 
this Western antidote to political and economic underdevelopment defined much of the 
Cold War conflict.17 
 The Cold War birthed profound political changes to interstate relations in ways 
not previously seen until 1945. In the wake of the Peace of Paris, new Soviet and U.S. 
competition for ideological dominance, military power and economic preeminence 
defined international relations. In that period, foreign assistance programmes were 
hitched to development theories advocated by the two superpowers across the developing 
world. In many African countries, superpower interventions either accommodated 
autocratic leaders or sought to oust unfriendly administrations from office, irrespective of 
their regime type.18 To achieve these goals, foreign assistance was allocated or cutback 
for various African governments as a reward or punishment for their foreign and 
domestic policy choices during the Cold War.   
 
16 Matthew Lockwood, “Will a Marshall Plan for Africa Make Poverty History?,” Journal of International 
Development: The Journal of the Development Studies Association 17, no. 6 (2005): 775–89; Pavel 
Nováček, “The Future of Development Assistance – Do We Need a New Marshall Plan?,” Development, 
Environment and Foresight 1, no. 2 (December 14, 2015): 92–105; Michele Fratianni and Paolo Savona, 
Sustaining Global Growth and Development: G7 and IMF Governance (New York: Routledge, 2016).  
17 Leslie O. Omoruyi, Contending Theories on Development Aid: Post-Cold War Evidence from Africa 
(Routledge, 2017). 
18 Olajide Aluko, “African Response to External Intervention in Africa since Angola,” African Affairs 80, 
no. 319 (1981): 159–79; Elizabeth Schmidt, Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War 
on Terror, vol. 7 (Cambridge University Press, 2013); Awinsong, “The Power of the Periphery: Aid, 
Mutuality and Cold War U.S-Ghana Relations, 1957-1966.” All these scholars discuss the Cold War aid 
programmes of donors in Africa in detail and explore how African countries were affected by Cold War 
power politics as well as African reactions to these profound geopolitical challenges in those decades. 
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In it was in this geopolitical climate that Ghana’s relations with the United States 
was founded. Foreign assistance politics, global diplomacy over Communism, and 
African independence and conflict issues defined Ghana-U.S. bilateral relations from the 
1950s onwards. Using a myriad of available diplomatic resources, the Ghanaian people 
and leadership courted American financial investment and foreign assistance to undertake 
capital projects such as the Akosombo Dam. In fact, Ghana received the first Peace Corp 
volunteers from the Kennedy administration in 1961 as part of the effort to strengthen 
Ghana-U.S. relations as well as supporting the social and economic development agenda 
of the new Ghanaian state. The nature of this bilateral relationship was emblematic of 
U.S. Cold War politics with developing states in Africa and beyond.  
In the post-Cold War period, a myriad of factors grounded Washington's aid 
policies towards African countries. American aid initiatives aimed at catering to 
humanitarian needs: to protect the lives of people in disaster situations abroad, to aid war-
torn communities, and to help societies suffering from famine or disease. The historically 
diverse nature of aid intent convinces Carol Lancaster, a scholar of U.S. aid policy and a 
former assistant director of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 
that there are complexities in U.S. aid policy because there are no easy answers to the 
question: “Why do countries give aid?”19 Without dismissing other legitimate views, 
Lancaster identifies domestic factors such as lobby groups as more essential than external 
influences in determining U.S. aid policy towards other countries. Policymakers’, a part 
of that internal politics, stressed democracy advancement to which substantial foreign aid 
was committed to. Eric Neumayer, a political scientist at the London School of 
 
19 Carol Lancaster, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2008), ix.  
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Economics, also researched, specifically, whether good governance influenced aid 
allocation of donors during the first decades of the post-Cold War period.20 He concludes 
that “democracy, respect for human rights, low military expenditures and low regulatory 
burden” in recipient states are important determinants of donors' tendency to give aid. 21 
But Keith N. Griffins and John L. Enos, economists at Oxford University, disagree.22 
While acknowledging the diversity of donors' aid purposes, they believe that, “foreign 
assistance has neither accelerated growth nor helped to foster democratic political 
regimes.”23 They are not alone. Dambisa Moyo has gone so far as to describe non-
emergency foreign assistance as “dead aid” for African recipients because assistance 
packages have crippled economies; they have increased inflation for most of the small 
economies receiving aid.24  
Historiography 
The Promotion of Democracy and U.S. Foreign Policy 
Democracy took roots in the United States from the pre-revolutionary era when early 
European settlers established communities with government structures to maintain law, 
order and decorum.25 But spread of that democracy abroad took time. Democracy 
promotion as an American foreign policy did not emerge without internal political 
debates and struggle. Indeed, other foreign policy issues in the United States have been 
 
20 Eric Neumayer, The Pattern of Aid Giving: The Impact of Good Governance on Development Assistance 
(London: Routledge, 2005).  
21 Neumayer, The Pattern of Aid Giving, 97.  
22 K. B. Griffin and J. L. Enos, “Foreign Assistance: Objectives and Consequences,” Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 18, no. 3 (1970): 313–27.  
23 Griffin and Enos, Foreign Assistance, 326.  
24 Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa 
(Macmillan, 2009). 
25 Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. 10 (Regnery Publishing, 2003). 
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defined largely by local politics such as U.S. entry into World War I.26 For instance, 
David Kennedy explores Congressional and White House concerns about crafting the 
right public opinion about World War I in view of “America’s diverse accumulation of 
ethnic groups.”27 The earliest most important work on identity politics in U.S foreign 
policy came in a 1948 book, The Man in the Street: The Impact of American Public 
Opinion on Foreign Policy.28 In this book, Thomas Bailey posits that identity activism in 
U.S. foreign policy making was pervasive to the extent that it sometimes outweighed 
executive and legislative authority on critical foreign policy matters.  
Similarly, Louis Wirth argues that external policy is a process of contestation 
among various power centres within nations. In the United States, he explains, dominant 
groups molded U.S. foreign policy to safeguard their economic and racial spaces. Such 
racial influences on foreign policy sometimes took the form of bigotry against certain 
cultural groups. Examples include legislation like Executive Order 9066 (1942) by 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the earlier Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), which sought to 
limit immigration and the movement of Japanese and Chinese groups into and within the 
U.S. Wirth therefore emphasizes how racial, ethnic, and religious or denominational 
 
26 David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (Oxford University Press, 
2004); Clifford Wilcox, “World War I and the Attack on Professors of German at the University of 
Michigan,” History of Education Quarterly 33, no. 1 (1993): 59–84. Due to a significant population of 
German immigrant descendants in the Mid-West, for instance, there were deep social divisions about the 
war for many Midwestern politicians and citizens. Cox explores this theme with respect to how German 
professors at the University of Michigan fared at the hands of local anti-German activists. About five 
million German immigrants entered the United States in the 1890s, according to statistics reported by 
Aneta Pavlenko in “We Have Room for but One Language Here’: Language and National Identity in the 
US at the Turn of the 20th Century,” Multilingua 21, no. 2/3 (2002): 163–96.  
27 Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society, 46. 
28 Thomas Andrew Bailey, The Man in the Street: The Impact of American Public Opinion on Foreign 
Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1948), chap. 1.  
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divisions and imaginations rivaled each other in determining the direction of U.S. foreign 
policy.29 
By the 1980s, the tenor of the scholarship shifted to understand how deep social 
layers and economic motives affected the crafting of U.S foreign policy in the twentieth 
century. Robert Dallek, a U.S. foreign relations historian, argues for an understanding of 
“nonrational influences on foreign policy.”30 He sees these non-rational factors as 
“undercurrents, of mood, tone, or milieu, of a climate of feeling that almost imperceptibly 
insinuates itself into concrete ideas and actions” which are largely “subjective influences 
that makers and backers of foreign policy barely glimpse themselves.”31 Dallek holds that 
these subjective factors are harder to show than the more objective categories.32  
Historian Michael Hunt also makes the case for ideology in U.S. foreign policy 
explaining that “the fundamental propositions of American foreign policy are rooted in 
the process of nation-building, in domestic social arrangements broadly understood, and 
in ethnic and class divisions.”33 He laments the dearth of literature in detailing “the 
dimensions of that ideology, the roots that sustain it...and the precise relationship it bears 
to policy.”34 He notices that concrete values and beliefs that have defined foreign policy 
in the U.S. emerged from the country’s history of liberty. More importantly, these values 
 
29 Bailey, The Man in the Street; Louis Wirth, “Domestic Ethnic and Racial Tensions in American Foreign 
Policy” (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organizaton, 1950), SS/TAIU/EG/7.  
30 Robert Dallek, The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs (Random 
House Inc, 1983), xii.  
31 Dallek, The American Style of Foreign Policy, xiii. 
32 Dallek, The American Style of Foreign Policy, xiv. Freedom House and other think tanks conduct annual 
studies that quantify these previously non-rational factors to understand the growth and deepening of 
democratic values around the world. 
33 Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and US Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 16.  
34 Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2.  
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and cultural assumptions have a subtle rather than an apparent effect on foreign policy 
because they were derived from an unconscious consensus in society. Hunt sees the 
sources of these beliefs and values in the personal opinions of the American elite and in 
public opinion. These sources, according to Hunt, contain the “symbols and mythology” 
which are drawn from unconscious social consensus about thoughts, attitudes and ideals 
that unite the community.35 But what is ideology in this context? Hunt sees ideology as 
inclusive and consistent “symbols, values, and beliefs” agreed upon by society.36 He 
identifies race, the American notion of liberty, and revolution as the main ideologies that 
drove U.S. foreign policy. 
In the post-Cold War era, the academic discussion meshed both cultural and 
ethnic identities to explain how American foreign policy is created. Ernest J. Wilson III’s 
work, Diversity and U.S. Foreign Policy attempts to correlate emerging ethnic diversity 
at home in the U.S. to the nation’s actions abroad.37 Wilson, whose expertise combines 
communication and political science, explains that “multicultural relations can affect a 
country’s ties with immediate neighbors, with overseas diasporas, with distant nations 
that send immigrants, and with the global community as a whole.”38 For this reason, 
Wilson sees minority groups’ experiences in the U.S. as encouraging them to advocate 
broader interactions between the U.S. and their home countries. Such immigrant 
advocacy groups may have economic, cultural and investment connections to their 
original nation-states that fuel their activism. For example, African, Asian and Middle 
Eastern foreign policy advocates in U.S. foreign policy circles promoted the interest of 
 
35 Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, 15.  
36 Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, 12.  
37 Ernest J. Wilson III, Diversity and US Foreign Policy: A Reader (Psychology Press, 2004). 
38 Wilson III, Diversity and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2. 
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their countries of origin. While he acknowledges that identity politics can derail foreign 
policy making, he adds that minorities’ views on “international development, 
intercultural communications, and globalization, gained through past exclusion and 
marginalization, may in fact help the country, as a whole, design better roadmaps to a 
more peaceful and cooperative global future.”39 The diverse values, insights and views of 
minorities help construct more culturally sensitive policies towards the world’s different 
countries.  
 Like Hunt, Andrew W. Stewart, an intelligence officer and scholar at the U.S. 
army college, recognizes that U.S. foreign policy extends beyond domestic race and 
religious leanings to include the nation’s political understanding of its place in world 
history as a democratic and free society.40 He calls this understanding the New Paradigm. 
This paradigm is based on the popular belief in American exceptionalism. At the core of 
this is the belief in “upward social and economic mobility, new concept of social justice 
and individual liberties under the rules of law, separation of church and state,” and the 
values of democratic accountability that governments derive their power from and to the 
people.41 For Americans, this self-perception is at the heart of the unique cultural and 
social experiences that separate them from other nations and peoples.42 So from the 
 
39 Wilson III, Diversity and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2.  
40 Andrew Stewart, “Friction in U.S. Foreign Policy: Cultural Difficulties with the World” (Army War 
College Carlisle Barracks PA, March 15, 2006), http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA448800.  
41 Stewart, "Friction in U.S. Foreign Policy," 6. 
42 Robert Dallek has explored this notion of liberty as a value proffered by U.S. citizens in their external 
policy in the post-1945 years when Washington used liberty and democracy as a cover to engage in proxy 
wars in Vietnam, Cambodia, Iran and Chile, among others. See Dallek, The American Style of Foreign 
Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs, xvii–xviii. In another sense, one could argue that this is a 
reinvention of the idea of the expanding American frontier, a major psychological and cultural marker in 
U.S. history. In this case, the frontier moved beyond a physical place to be conquered into an abstract idea 
involving the export of American ideals and culture to a supposedly politically and socially decadent or 
retrogressing world. For a detailed review of the significance of the frontier in U.S. history, see Frederick 
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dominance of race, ethnic, religious, commercial and multicultural issues in foreign 
policy, the role of identity in foreign policy culminated in the rise of democracy as the 
most distinct national identity defining U.S. policy choices.  
 According to Colin Cavell, a scholar of U.S. democratization, this faith that 
Americans hold in the political uniqueness of their polity as a democracy has become an 
identity and point of national consensus. That conviction about America and of 
Americans as politically free, secular, capitalist, and socially mobile replaced other 
considerations for national identity. In the process, a desire to promote “Made-in-
America” democracy became a policy pursued in international relations.43  
In his paper, Democracy Promotion as a World Value, Michael McFaul of 
Stanford University explains how the fall of Soviet power in 1989 solidified democracy 
as the universally acceptable form of government in the post-Communist era.44 Though 
still a distant goal for many states, democracy remained the only socially and politically 
agreeable form of consensus building and power sharing the world over. McFaul claims 
that U.S. adoption of democracy promotion under President Bill Clinton was a logical 
outcome of the shifting geopolitical dynamics of a post-Soviet world. But, unfortunately, 
Clinton tethered democracy promotion to U.S. global security concerns to a point where 
coercion was validated. In the process, the president legitimized a dominant, U.S. 
 
Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1920). Turner 
argues throughout this book that the frontier defined the U.S. quest for expansion throughout history. 
43 Cavell, “The National Endowment for Democracy and the Export of 'Made-in-America' Democracy.” In 
an edited volume, Michael Cox, Joh Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi discuss this problem of U.S. global 
democracy advocacy. They note the divergent strands of argument regarding democracy, one of which sees 
democracy promotion as Western arrogance. For more details see Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry, and 
Takashi Inoguchi, American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts (Oxford University 
Press, 2000). 
44 Michael McFaul, “Democracy Promotion as a World Value,” The Washington Quarterly 28, no. 1 
(December 1, 2004): 147–63, https://doi.org/10.1162/0163660042518189. 
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interventionist foreign policy exemplified by actions in Haiti, Kosovo, and Somalia. 
Rasmus Sondergaard, a Danish scholar of U.S. foreign relations, comes to similar 
conclusions about U.S. democracy promotion after the end of the Cold War.45  He 
reasons that the promotion of democracy abroad effectively replaced containment as the 
central American security strategy.46 The consensus among these scholars is that 
promotion of democracy lent a hand to an increasingly militaristic, interventionist foreign 
policy in Washington after the fall of communism. 
 Other scholars highlight the economic implications of democracy promotion for 
U.S. global leadership.47 Writing early in the 1990s, the famous liberal American 
economist W.W. Rostow recommended that the domestic economy and larger U.S. 
commercial interests must become the vital focus of U.S. national security in the post-
Cold War political context.48 His words got the ear of the George W.H. Bush and, later, 
Clinton administration officials. About a decade and half later, Barbara A. Riffer and 
Kristan Mercer noticed this emphasis on economic and military policy over democratic 
enlargement in the presidencies of Clinton and George Walker Bush.49 In spite of 
rehashing the Cold War rhetoric of world democratic advance, U.S. officials adopted 
pragmatism in foreign policy as was evident in American collaborations with the 
communist Chinese regime, the governments of Chile and Yugoslavia, and even, Russia 
 
45 Rasmus Sinding Søndergaard, “Bill Clinton’s ‘Democratic Enlargement’ and the Securitisation of 
Democracy Promotion,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 26, no. 3 (July 3, 2015): 534–51, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2015.1067529. 
46 Analogous claims have been made by Michael Fowler, a professor at the U.S. Airforce Academy.See 
Michael W. Fowler, “A Brief Survey of Democracy Promotion in US Foreign Policy,” Democracy and 
Security 11, no. 3 (July 3, 2015): 227–47, https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2015.1045974.  
47 Greg Schmergel, ed., U.S. Foreign Policy in the 1990s, 1st ed. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 1991); 
Barbara Ann J. Rieffer and Kristan Mercer, “US Democracy Promotion: The Clinton and Bush 
Administrations,” Global Society 19, no. 4 (October 1, 2005): 385–408, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13600820500242654; Cavell, “The National Endowment for Democracy and the 
Export of "Made-in-America" Democracy.” 
48 Schmergel, U.S. Foreign Policy in the 1990s. 
49 Rieffer and Mercer, “US Democracy Promotion.” 
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after 1989. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the 
United States Information Agency (USIA) and the State Department, all key agencies of 
democracy promotion, operated independent democracy promotion programmes which 
led to overlap and duplication in foreign policy. The U.S emphasis on pragmatism and its 
lack of commitment to organizing a centralized democratic promotion effort led Rieffer 
and Mercer to conclude that democracy promotion was subordinated to economic and 
military concerns in post-Cold War U.S. global strategy.  
Cavell also argues that Washington stressed economic and military concerns 
despite preaching democracy promotion.50 Through the National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED), the U.S. pushed democratic advancement abroad notwithstanding the 
ethical concerns of such a policy. According to Cavell, the particular meaning the U.S. 
attached to democracy abroad favoured a capitalist economic model which opened up 
markets for American commercial interests. That understanding of democracy attempted 
to replicate U.S. capitalist style democracy in states around the world with little regard 
for the specific histories of those states. Democracy promotion was thus a policy for 
entrenching American economic hegemony. Similarly, Izzah Malik explains that a 
democratic global political environment allowed for American commercial interests to 
blossom based on the theory that democracies have stable political climates for capitalist 
driven market economies.51 He adds that these commercial interests tied in with national 
security and humanitarian considerations in guiding U.S. post-Soviet policy.52 
 
50 Cavell, “The National Endowment for Democracy and the Export of "Made-in-America" Democracy.” 
51 Izzah Akram Malik, “Analyzing the Motivations of US Development Aid to Africa,” University of Texas 
(Master's Thesis), 2013. 
52 Akram Malik, "Analyzing the Motivations of US Development Aid to Africa.”  
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Democracy promotion therefore served to advance the important economic and strategic 
considerations of U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War period.  
 The literature therefore indicates the centrality of the promotion of democracy to 
United States foreign policy. In the 20th Century however, the advance of 
democratization as foreign policy did not always sync well with other concerns such as 
national security. Democracy advancement became an ideal that supported the vigorous 
security and economic interests which were the basis of American global power and 
engagement. The U.S. desired to use democracy to counter political anarchy and 
instability in the developing world to create a community of democracies under American 
leadership and suitable for U.S. economic interest.53  
Aid and Democratization in Post-Cold War Africa 
In the post-Cold War period, African states received the bulk of foreign assistance from 
the developed northern nations like the United States.54 Correspondingly, there was a 
bulge in Western expectations that recipient states would show improved legal, political, 
social and economic conditions. For this reason, Nicolas van de Walle, a leading 
American scholar of Africa, and Danielle Resnick, a senior fellow at the International 
Food Policy Research Institute, advocate in favour of disaggregation of various aid 
categories when discussing aid and democratization in Africa.55 They distinguish 
between democracy aid and development aid emphasizing that the former has greater 
focus on positively influencing the emergence of the rule of law and consolidation of 
 
53 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” 
International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 391–425. 
54 Danielle Resnick and Nicolas Van de Walle, Democratic Trajectories in Africa: Unravelling the Impact 
of Foreign Aid (Oxford University Press, 2013). 
55 Resnick and Van de Walle, “Introduction: Why Aid and Democracy? Why Africa?” Democratic 
Trajectories in Africa: Unravelling the Impact of Foreign Aid, 1–27. 
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good governance practices. Democracy aid, they note, is categorized into assistance for 
transition(ing) democracies or consolidating democracies and that donor focus on 
democracy aid produce better political dividends in developing countries. Lise Rakner, a 
Bergen based professor of comparative politics, furthers the discussion by noting the role 
of foreign democracy aid in sustaining legitimate local activism in Zambia as a means of 
diminishing fear of the rise of a powerful presidential office.56 Her analysis sides with 
Van de Walle and Resnick’s view that democratic consolidation differs from democratic 
transition and that donors need to know and understand that their support in a post-
transition democratic environment furthers political accountability as well as limits the 
abuse of power by ruling politicians.  
However, John Mbaku, a Camerounian born American professor of Economics, 
and Julius Ihonvbere, a Nigerian professor of Politics, contend that while external support 
for prodemocracy forces in African democracies is important, these democratizing agents 
stayed true to their “autonomy, originality, and refuse…prepackaged political programs 
and methods” from the outside. 57 They argue that African democratization was a 
response to the largely negative impact of the structurally adjusted economies of the 
1980s. Mbaku and Ihonvbere explain that mass demands for greater inclusion in decision 
making met varied responses from power holders in Africa in the 1990s. Mbaku and 
Ihonvbere conclude that democratic change was the outcome of local intents, actions, and 
persistence with some external donor backing.58 This critical view of external support and 
 
56 Lise Rakner, Foreign Aid and Democratic Consolidation in Zambia (WIDER Working Paper, 2012). 
57 John Mukum Mbaku and Julius O. Ihonvbere, Multiparty Democracy and Political Change: Constraints 
to Democratization in Africa (Routledge, 2018). 
58 They add that these internal sources of activism should remain true to democracy promotion with only 
minimal external input. 
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assistance for democracy places African people and forces at the forefront in 
democratization. 
 Similarly, Kebapetse Lotshwao, a professor of Politics in Botswana, contends that 
the urban-based Batswana democracy aid recipients thwarted genuine mass democracy. 
For instance, he decries the Botswana Electoral Commission and political parties’ 
disproportionate share of donor assistance for democracy over the years arguing it 
entrenched an elite-led democracy that neglected larger development concerns of the 
masses.59 While official foreign assistance programmes boosted institutional capacity to 
actively challenge for a share of the political space or resist the abuse of office by power 
wielders, recipients tended to be urban elites whose work furthered capitalist democratic 
forms. This system of urban concentrated aid activities benefited donors and their 
commercial partners seeking the right political climate for capitalism in poor countries. 
However, Lotshwao’s view confuses the intent of democracy aid and development 
assistance. As van Walle and Resnick suggest, democracy assistance has specific 
governance ends that differ from the more socially oriented and economically focused 
ends of development aid. Rakner explains in another study that donors’ bolstering of the 
economic and political liberalization process in Zambia inhibited the institutionalization 
of a strong party system in the country.60 Subsequently, executive power expanded to an 
extent not expected for a consolidating democracy like Zambia. That expansion of power 
stifled opportunities for the injection of genuine civil society voices in decision making 
and was antithetical to democratic consolidation and the rule of law.  
 
59 Kebapetse Lotshwao, “Donor Assistance and Democracy in Botswana,” Available at SSRN 2497797, 
2014. 
60 Lise Rakner, “Institutionalizing the Pro-Democracy Movements: The Case of Zambia’s Movement for 
Multiparty Democracy,” Democratization 18, no. 5 (2011): 1106–24. 
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While aid offered some needed support to democracy advocates in some recipient 
countries such as Ghana, Zambia and Botswana, Van De Walle also faults foreign aid for 
Mali’s inability to sustain stability despite large quantities of foreign assistance since the 
1990s.61 Though aid supported the peaceable democracy of Mali, other factors such as 
increasing gold prices and the devaluation of Mali’s currency breathed life into Mali’s 
economy and politics. If anything, Van De Walle argues, aid complicated Malian 
democracy by affording the executive access to resources to expand its powers. Foreign 
assistance also engendered “a growing socio-cultural cleavage between urban elites and 
the rest of the population.”62 As Mali’s case shows, foreign assistance did not always lead 
to democratic stability. As these studies demonstrate, the peculiarities of local conditions 
define how far aid effects democratic change. 
In contrast to the above critical scholars, Clark Gibbon, Barak Hoffman, and Ryan 
Jablonski, all political scientists, explain that it was donor visibility and vigilance in the 
disbursement and usage of assistance in the 1990s that helped curb recipient governments 
use of aid to perpetuate themselves in power.63 Aid monitoring hindered incumbents’ 
ability to buy off electoral coalitions. In this way, power holders, autocrats particularly, 
conceded ground to other constituencies clamoring for a share of the political space and 
of political power. This approach helped limit executive power while allowing for local 
ownership of the democratizing process. That monitoring of aid explains why local civil 
society groups, like aid organizations, added to democracy and accountability in Africa. 
 
61 Nicolas Van de Walle, Foreign Aid in Dangerous Places: The Donors and Mali’s Democracy (WIDER 
Working Paper, 2012). 
62 Van de Walle, Foreign Aid in Dangerous Places, 3. 
63 Clark C. Gibson, Barak D. Hoffman, and Ryan S. Jablonski, “Did Aid Promote Democracy in Africa? 
The Role of Technical Assistance in Africa’s Transitions,” World Development 68 (2015): 323–35. 
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 Aside from limiting political excesses, some form of foreign assistance was used 
to strengthen local groups to make them more visible not just in politics but in debates 
over policy. Julie Hearn, a professor of Politics at Lancaster University, finds that foreign 
assistance programmes in African countries such as Ghana, South Africa, and Uganda 
elevated the vocality of civil society groups in ways that afforded them profound 
influence over the form and content of debates about democracy, local government, and 
women. In Ghana, aid givers favoured civil society groups championing liberal economic 
ideals.64 Aid recipients in Ghana, the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) among them, 
were outspoken in the discussions over economic policy such as the Structural 
Adjustment Program among other liberal leaning economic policies of the 1990s. Such 
civil society aid recipients’ support for liberal, capitalist economic policies convinced 
Mark Robinson, a governance expert on Africa, that such democratic aid in Africa was a 
concealed form of “free market racketeering.”65  
 The scholarship thus shows that aid helped democratization in some respects but 
critical views such as Van de Walles’, Mbaku and Ihonvbere’s, and Lotshwao’s challenge 
such idealistic views of foreign assistance in post-Cold War democratization in Africa. 
U.S. Africa Policy  
U.S. policy in Africa did not always align with the African mass interest in 
democracy as a panacea to the development challenges facing the continent. Michael 
Clough, a scholar of U.S. foreign policy in the Third World, argues that U.S. Cold War 
strategy in Africa sacrificed democracy for conformity, which in turn bred “injustice, 
 
64 Julie Hearn, “Foreign Aid, Democratisation and Civil Society in Africa: A Study of South Africa, Ghana 
and Uganda,” IDS Discussion Paper 368, 2010. 
65 Mark Robinson, “Civil Society in Africa: A Conceptual Overview” (Mimeo, 1998). 
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corruption, and economic mismanagement” for much of the conflict.66 He further 
contends that since the 1980s, American policies overlooked Africa in favour of 
supposedly more important domains elsewhere in the world such as South East Asia, the 
Middle East and the Gulf Region. Clough calls for the U.S. to create and pursue policies 
to engage Africa effectively to “foster and sustain African civil society...promote 
democracy and development.”67 Like earlier studies on democratization, Clough 
acknowledges social forces in the discussion of political change and democracy in Africa. 
In a similar way, Raymond W. Copson, a liberal foreign policy historian previously of 
the Library of Congress, explains that fairness and justice was lacking in U.S. policy in 
Africa. He acknowledges that evangelical groups and the Congressional Black Caucus 
(CBC) put significant pressure on U.S. policy in Africa. However, he fears a loss of U.S 
influence in Africa because the U.S. has been “perceived as unfair and unjust in its 
foreign policy.”68 Copson notes that attention to U.S. moral responsibility is warranted 
because black citizens brought from Africa were forced to contribute to the “economic 
development of the American South and the country as a whole.”69 Despite these black 
nation-building contributions, Washington stood aloof from the continent for much of 
history. Not even Liberia, an offshoot of U.S. ex-slaves, could sustain U.S. attention for 
long. Neglect therefore characterized the U.S. policy towards Africa, according to 
Copson. In his opinion, a reversal was necessary to ensure fairness and justice in U.S.-
Africa relations.  
 
66 Michael Clough, Free at Last?: US Policy toward Africa and the End of the Cold War (Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1992), 1. 
67 Clough, Free at Last?: 3–4. 
68 Raymond W. Copson, The United States in Africa: Bush Policy and Beyond (London: Zed Books, 2007), 
2. 
69 Copson, The United States in Africa: 3. 
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 Peter Schrader, a longtime scholar of U.S. policy in Africa, holds the view that 
U.S. policymakers tended to ignore the African continent until some sort of politico-
military crisis on the continent grabbed global attention.70 Examining continuity and 
change in U.S. Africa policy over the decades, Schrader concludes that “dominant 
patterns of US interventionist practices on the continent” were prevalent leading to policy 
swings from neglect to occasional attention and then back to neglect.71 Donald Rothchild 
and Edmond J. Keller, political scientists at the University of California, Los Angeles, 
call attention to the need for the U.S. to abandon its policy of neglect and help African 
governments manage their security challenges as well as find a way to negotiate issues 
such as debts, the fight against AIDS, and environmental concerns.72 These security, 
economic and human concerns raised in Rothchild and Keller's work might be viewed as 
predicated on Schraeder's contention, that for much of history, Africa has been on the 
periphery of U.S. policy. These scholarly views encourage us to examine U.S. 
engagement with Africa in the post-Cold War years with a focus on how Washington 
promoted free enterprises and democratic institutions in Ghana.    
The Project 
Building on the above literature, this thesis examines how the U.S., in working to 
redefine its relations with the world after the Cold War, reoriented its approach towards 
Africa by emphasizing the promotion of democracy, particularly the adoption of 
American style institutions, as the panacea to the political and economic challenges 
facing the continent. I make the case that American national identity, namely its 
 
70 Peter J. Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change, vol. 
31 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 2. 
71 Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa, 8. 
72 Donald S. Rothchild, Africa-US Relations: Strategic Encounters (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2006). 
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democracy, the rule of law, and press freedom informed much of Washington's post-Cold 
War foreign aid policies in Africa. Further, it is argued that though U.S. domestic 
ideology shaped its foreign policy towards Africa, targets of that policy did not always 
act as people to be taught or dictated to in the art of government and democratization. 
Using a case study of Ghana, I contend that local democracy activists and national 
leaders blended western concepts of democracy with their own history, indigenous 
political experiences, and local contexts to fashion a workable constitutional framework 
to serve administrative needs and to deliver desired public goods. The result was that 
those democratic changes were more Ghanaian than American even if the overall idea of 
a democratic framework at a national level was originally an European idea.   
 The choice of Ghana for the case study is important for two reasons: firstly, 
Ghana emerged as an early democracy reformer in the late 1980s when the Cold War 
ended; secondly, it consistently ranked high for democracy and economic development 
among democratized countries in Africa in the post-Cold War period. 
Methodology 
Major Research Questions 
(a) What competing discourses led to the emergence of democracy promotion in the 
U.S. foreign aid policies of the George H.W. Bush and William Clinton 
presidencies? 
(b) In what ways did U.S. aid efforts contribute to democracy consolidation after the 
Cold War in Ghana?  
(c) How did the Ghanaian people respond to U.S. democracy promotion efforts after 
the Cold War?  
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(d) How did the Ghanaian people shape the pace and form of democratic reform in 
Ghana’s transition to the Fourth Republic in 1993?   
Primary Sources 
To address the research questions above, I utilized a variety of primary sources. 
For discussions and opinions on foreign policy under the George H.W. Bush and the 
early Bill Clinton presidencies, I accessed the online archives of The Washington Post, 
The Wall Street Journal, and The New York Times. Based on these sources, politicians, 
journalists and policy makers' views on the future of U.S. foreign and aid policy after the 
Cold War are examined. More specifically, I explore the connections between official 
thoughts and their policy manifestations in aid allocations to Africa from bodies such as 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Census 
Office. Perhaps most importantly, I examine how those allocations correlated with 
democratic markers such as human rights, free elections, and the free press in Ghana. 
In addition to these newspapers, I used information from sources such as the 
USAID Trend Data, Freedom House’s measures of press freedom, and trade figures from 
the U.S. census office. This project also benefited from Africa Elections Database's 
information on the election histories of Ghana, Zambia, Botswana, and Benin.  
To evaluate Ghanaian responses to U.S. efforts to transplant its politics into 
Ghanaian political space, I conducted archival research at the Public Records, Archives 
Administration Department (PRAAD) and the Balm Library of the University of Ghana, 
both located in Accra. At these sites, I researched mainly the Ghanaian Times and The 
People’s Daily Graphic (later the Daily Graphic after January 1994) newspapers for 
government policy thoughts, opposition politicians' activities, and other citizen related 
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activities in promoting democracy. These state-owned papers were the most widely 
circulated in the 1980s and 1990s. They covered not only events throughout the country 
but provided a platform for all politicians and activists to send messages to people across 
the social, economic and geographic strata of Ghanaian society while benefiting from the 
highly professional journalism of those papers. As state newspapers, they were well 
funded so editors could hire highly professional staff who helped entrench a culture of 
independence.73  
Conclusion 
Albert Einstein observed that the “democratic trait...the relationship between individual 
people and the attitude they maintain towards one another” was a deeply ingrained value 
in the American psyche.74 However, while democracy promotion headlined America’s 
foreign policy in the post-Soviet era, it was superseded by continuing strategic and 
domestic economic commitments. Using a case study approach, this work contends that 
while Washington attempted to promote American political institutions in Ghana, the 
Ghanaian people demonstrated agency in owning and defining the pace and shape of 
democratic reform and progress in their country. In the process, Ghana showed that 
democracy is as much a universal concept as it is an American one.  
 
 
73 Yaw Twumasi, “The Newspaper Press and Political Leadership in Developing Nations: The Case of 
Ghana, 1964 to 1978,” Gazette (Leiden, Netherlands) 26, no. 1 (1980): 1–16. Cameron Duodu had opposed 
the foreign policy of Kwesi Busia, Ghanaian prime minister, in the early 1970s. He was dismissed from his 
role as editor of the Daily Graphic. The resulting tussle between government and the media provided much 
needed agency for the state newspapers in subsequent years. Recalling press freedom in the 1980s and 
1990s, Richard Jefferies and Clare Thomas argue that private newspapers during the PNDC military regime 
were rather “poorly produced and rather tacky newssheets” but enjoyed as much freedom as state-owned 
media. With the exception of The Ghanaian Chronicle and The Christian Chronicle’s brushes with the law, 
Jefferies and Thomas suggest that the PNDC avoided “curbing press freedom even when…opposition 
newspapers descended into muckraking and mudslinging.” See Richard Jeffries and Clare Thomas, “The 
Ghanaian Elections of 1992,” African Affairs 92, no. 368 (1993): 331–66. 
74 Fred Jerome and Rodger Taylor, Einstein on Race and Racism (Rutgers University Press, 2005), 140. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE BIRTH OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION: AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. 
NATIONAL DISCOURSE 
“My administration will stand up for democracy. We will offer international assistance to 
emerging fragile democracies.” Bill Clinton, Democratic presidential candidate, 1992.75 
 
This chapter examines the discourse and exchanges within policy and popular circles in 
the United States that enabled the emergence of democracy promotion as the central 
foreign policy tenet of Washington in the Post-Cold War era. It posits that American 
policymakers and public discourse setters couched democracy promotion as an extension 
of U.S. moral and political values to the world to establish likeminded political states that 
would sustain the rule of law and eliminate autocracy.76  
 
Throughout the Cold War, U.S. and Soviet strategies involved undermining each other in 
many proxy wars across the world. After the peace treaties were signed at Paris in 
February 1947, the U.S. and the USSR became involved in prolonged conflicts in Viet 
Nam and North Korea. In Afghanistan, the U.S. aided Afghan insurgents from 1979 to 
1989 to battle the USSR when Moscow invaded that country to support a puppet regime.  
 
75 “Excerpts from Clinton’s Speech on Foreign Policy Leadership,” New York Times, August 14, 1992. This 
speech was one of the important foreign policy statements Clinton made in the run up to the 1992 elections. 
76 Dean V. Babst, “Elective Governments: A Force for Peace,” The Wisconsin Sociologist 3, no. 1 (1964): 
9–14. By the Democratic Peace, Babst meant that elected governments are less likely to go to war because 
there is a large pool of public feelings and opinions they have to account to. Also, due to many 
constitutional processes involved in democracies going to war, it is assumed that democracies are unlikely 
to reach a consensus soon enough to allow democratic leaders to declare war on other states. The basis of 
this theory goes back to Immanuel Kant who gave rough outlines to this concept in his 1795 piece, On 
Perpetual Peace (Broadview Press, 2015). This understanding of the U.S. democratic leadership framed the 
Democratic Peace hypothesis from the late 1960s which became popular in the 1980s onwards and 
informed the development of democratic promotion as post-Cold War policy towards Africa.  
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 In the early 1980s, President Ronald Reagan’s administration increased U.S. 
defense expenditure to draw Moscow into an arms race. Massive hikes in U.S. defense 
spending supported the buildup of strategic nuclear weapons and the Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI).77 The cost of these American offensive and defense initiatives meant that 
the USSR had to make a choice either to challenge American military power or focus on 
domestic issues. Many analysts believe that the USSR took the bait, leading to an 
increase in military spending, crumpling infrastructure at home, and a weakened 
domestic economy. 78  
By the mid-1980s, the Soviet economy was in crisis with unemployment, 
corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, and economic mismanagement exacerbating an 
already restrictive political climate.79 To resolve these problems, Mikhail Gorbachev, the 
general secretary of the Politburo, emerged as an agent of reform in the Soviet Union. He 
helped reverse the course of Cold War tensions by pulling out of superpower 
competitions as well as implementing much needed economic reforms at home. He also 
signed the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, withdrew Soviet troops from 
Afghanistan, granted autonomy to satellite states in Eastern Europe, and supported 
German reunification.80 It was during this period that American policy makers vigorously 
revisited the promotion  of democracy as central to future U.S. policy around the world. 
 
77 McGeorge Bundy et al., “The President’s Choice: Star Wars or Arms Control,” Foreign Affairs, 63 
(1984): 264; Frances Fitzgerald, Way out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold 
War (Simon and Schuster, 2001). The SDI programme aimed to build space-based missile defense systems 
to counter Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) in the event of an attack on the United Sates. 
78 Nick Bisley, The End of the Cold War and the Causes of Soviet Collapse (Springer, 2004); Andrew E 
Busch, “Ronald Reagan and the Defeat of the Soviet Empire,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 27, no. 3 
(1997): 451–66. 
79 For a detailed economic analysis of Soviet economic decline, see  William Easterly and Stanley Fischer, 
“What We Can Learn from the Soviet Collapse,” Finance and Development 31, no. 4 (1994): 2–5. 
80 Vladislav Zubok, “Gorbachev and the End of the Cold War: Perspectives on History and Personality,” 
Cold War History 2, no. 2 (2002): 61–100.  
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1.1.The Resuscitation of an Idea: The Reagan Administration’s Emphasis on 
Democracy 
In 1988, the year before the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Vice President George W.H. 
Bush declared that “America has set in motion the major changes underway in the world 
today- the growth of democracy, the spread of free enterprise, the creation of a world 
market in goods and ideas. For the foreseeable future, no other nation, or group of 
nations, will step forward to assume leadership.”81 Bush’s assertion came as U.S. 
hegemony was entering a different phase – one of unrivalled global power. The change, 
brought about by the dying strength of the Soviet Union in the East-West struggle for 
world supremacy, cemented the U.S position as the leading global power. This shift 
required a rethink of U.S. external policy to synchronize with its unipolar authority after 
1989. Early policy predictions from the White House lauded U.S. cultural and political 
exceptionalism, a recurrent theme in American history, as the inevitable path for states 
emerging from Soviet influence who were seeking a path to economic prosperity and 
political maturity. Bush’s comment not only highlighted this emerging dominant theme in 
foreign policy but opened a possibility for decision makers to pursue this mindset as a 
foreign policy goal. 
Long before the end of the Cold War, the Reagan White House began presenting 
the possibility of exporting the U.S. political experience to create a community of free 
states that would sustain world peace. These aims were hinted at through speeches and 
documents on tactical decisions made within the context of the East-West struggle in the 
1980s. Though a staunch realist, Reagan often couched his remarks about the U.S. global 
interest as part of its efforts towards “the promotion of democracy and economic 
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growth,” important liberal ideals.82 Those efforts at democracy promotion included 
encouraging foreign direct investment to recipient states, expansion of foreign aid 
programs to poor countries, and boosting American involvement in humanitarian causes 
around the world.83  
 The idea of pursuing democracy as the new frontier in American expansionism 
centered firmly on the developing world where free political institutions were supposed 
to be nascent. In 1984, the administration demanded massive aid increases for Latin 
American states from Congress. Justifying the request, the administration argued that it 
would “advance democracy in the Latin American region.”84 Though later events in 
Nicaragua and El Salvador showed that Reagan had used U.S. power and resources for 
questionable causes, the administration’s claims about democratic values as justifications 
for its actions highlighted the growing importance of democratization as a foreign policy 
goal in Washington. But the promotion of democracy was aimed at specifically exporting 
the American model of democracy to the world. Cavill explains that that Made-in-
American democracy export emerged from U.S. view of democracy as a unique national 
identity that needed to be promoted to the rest of the world. 
Nevertheless, the realpolitik of the Cold War’s political and propaganda strategies 
limited the Reagan policymakers’ ability to propagate American style democratic 
processes and institutions across the world. Even in the early 1980s, Soviet power 
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persisted in international politics, especially, in the so-called ‘Third World.’85 The 
Reagan administration recognized Soviet influence in this region when it stated, for 
instance, that “the countries of the Caribbean basin are threatened by the worst economic 
depression since the 1930s as well as by a powerful Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan drive to 
expand their power and influence” in the world.86 In response to Soviet power, Reagan 
advisors recommended increased appropriations to support the ousting of pro-Communist 
autocrats from power in the developing world. In their place, Reagan hoped to create 
democratic administrations that would help establish freedom and liberal political orders 
in those developing countries. The most significant tool to achieve the democratic ends, 
in the context of the Cold War, was foreign aid. 
During the Cold War, the United States supported regimes sympathetic to U.S 
global security interests while showing hostility to antagonistic states. In this sense, the 
president entrenched Cold War impulses of supporting amiable regimes and or showing 
hostility towards antagonistic ones. Elizabeth Schmidt and Moses Awinsong contend that 
aid was used for the reward and punishment of friends and foes alike in Washington’s 
foreign policy.87 But in the post-Cold War period, Washington used aid to support the 
replication of the political values, institutions and experiences of the U.S. in other 
countries to create a core of democracies for meaningful engagement.88  
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The threat of mutually assured destruction put powers on constant alert during the 
period before 1989. These Cold War tensions contributed to the rise of the Reagan 
Doctrine, a set of American convictions about limiting Soviet expansion across the 
world.89 Clough notes that this U.S. preoccupation with larger strategic goals in the Cold 
War consigned democracy promotion to the backburner in Washington.90 Within the 
Cold War context, the American emphasis of strategy over democratization emboldened 
many African leaders, convinced of American support, to further “injustice, corruption, 
and economic mismanagement” in nations such as Ethiopia and Zaire.91 To enable 
Washington’s core decision-makers to focus on strategy alone, much of the work of 
democracy promotion was delegated to independent American institutions, such as the 
International Republican Institute(IRI), the National Democratic Institute(NDI), and the 
National Endowment for Democracy(NED).92 These bodies were funded by Congress but 
were not under the direct supervision of executive authority nor took directives from any 
executive or legislative authority in the Reagan administration.   
By 1986, a growing consensus on foreign policy emerged that united Democrats 
and Republicans on Capitol Hill in placing human rights, democracy and the environment 
at the centre of the discourse on foreign policy. Robert Tucker of the John Hopkins 
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University’s School of International Studies reminisced in 1986 that “Human rights, 
which was, to say the least, played down in 1981, now has greater importance.”93 In 
Congress, the new consensus on foreign policy found expression in the willingness of the 
House and Senate to essentialize democracy in the way the United States defined its 
relations with other states. For instance, Representative Bob Walker (Republican, PA), 
speaking about the House’s foreign policy considerations in 1986, called for the House to 
“evolve the idea that the strongest anticommunist position was in supporting majority 
governments that would maintain democracy.”94 The House’s position reflected a 
practical navigation of both the real Communist threat to Western freedom and the 
idealism of supporting the spread of free institutions in Third World states. This idealism 
emerged from a sense that planting democratic institutions in developing countries 
replicated U.S. freedom abroad. Robert S. Pastorino, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Inter-American Affairs, emphasized this in his view that “the Reagan 
Administration has a fundamental interest in the preservation and promotion of 
democratic institutions in Central America” as indeed it was interested in doing so in 
many other places.95 The rhetoric of democratization was thus rooted in a need to extend 
domestic political experiences and arrangements to other countries. Hunt and Stewart see 
the basis of democracy export effort in the domestic consensus that places 
democratization at the heart of American identity.96 Despite this emphasis on spreading 
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democracy, the Reagan Doctrine defined much of American foreign policy during the 
closing years of the Cold War.97  
At the same time, the 1980s afforded the opportunity for politicians and policy 
makers to reevaluate and reposition democracy in the discourse on U.S. foreign policy. 
That new direction was taken in the conviction that it was America’s responsibility to 
spread the political processes and institutions that had worked for it to other states to 
create a global community of free, democratic states. According to Thomas Carothers of 
the Carnegie Center, this perspective led the Reagan administration to intervene militarily 
in Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador to further the establishment of liberal 
democratic regimes in those countries.98 However, while democracy promotion became 
the basis of Reagan policy, the means towards the ends were not always democratic.99 It 
became apparent that the democracy rhetoric was invoked by the administration when it 
suited American economic and security interests in other lands. Public reaction to such 
unsanctioned use of force in places such as Honduras and Guatemala eventually 
compelled Reagan to source out democracy promotion to private U.S. think tanks. 
 From 1983 onwards, private institutions funded by the U.S. government took on 
the active advancement of democracy. These organizations included the National 
Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican Institute, and the National 
 
97 The Iran-Contra Affair was an example of the president’s application of the Reagan Doctrine. Though 
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Democratic Institute. The NED, established on November 18, 1983, started its pro-
democracy agenda in many developing countries. For the 1986 fiscal year alone, about 
$54 million was expended by the Endowment to bolster organizations, individuals and 
causes that promised political change and democratic growth in states suffering right-
wing dictatorships around the world. The capital injection assisted labour unions, 
political parties and journalists in states with fragile or non-existent democracies to 
become effective advocates for the return to civilian or majoritarian rule.100 The novelty 
of the NED’s work was “a promotion of democracy and free enterprise, that mixes public 
funds and private interests” through annual appropriation from Congress.101 Think-tanks 
like the NED were left to decide on all matter of administration, expenditure and the 
forms of engagement to champion in their activities around the world.  
This private effort departed from the clandestine operations of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) in earlier decades where the intelligence body provided help 
to dissident groups in the Third World to overthrow legitimate governments. According 
to John Brian Atwood, president of the NDI, those secretive activities of the CIA’s before 
the 1980s were responsible for the “terrible damages to our own values” because the 
intelligence body’s work “reflected a misunderstanding of what our values as democratic 
society were all about.”102 Makers and influencers of policy like Atwood reflected a 
deepening sense of confidence in the superiority and moral strength of American 
democracy as a model for global adoption. Given the open and transparent work of the 
NED, he saw it as representing the best outlet to advertise U.S. democracy. Atwood’s 
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view resonates with the argument made by Andrew Stewart that the U.S. perception of its 
political, social and cultural exceptionalism stimulated its attempts at exporting 
democracy to other countries.103  
 The NED was by no means the only democracy advocate under the Reagan 
Administration. The IRI and the NDI had similar programmes running in other countries. 
David K. Shipler reported that while Democrats, through the NDI, supported conferences 
and seminars for a variety of parties to strengthen centrist and leftist politics, the 
Republicans used the IRI to help parties in other countries that held similar conservative 
American positions on foreign policy and economic issues.104 These organizations 
therefore worked towards exporting specific American political brands abroad. However, 
the close interest both organizations shared in spreading the rule of law meant that U.S. 
democracy promotion support favoured parties championing distinctly American political 
forms of organizations, thoughts and institutions. Such attempts confirm Hunt’s 
conclusion that American notions of liberty, expressed in political organization and 
association, is the main driver of U.S. external policy.105  
However, as Cavell points out, this American approach was not always consistent 
with the local political contexts of targeted nations; it neglected the peculiar histories of 
countries to whom democracy was supposedly exported to.106 The IRI, for instance, sent 
a weighty amount of capital support to Nicaragua in 1986 and to other conservative 
elements elsewhere opposed to communists and other left-wing ruling forces.107 By the 
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1990s, the IRI extended its work to Africa where it held conferences for right leaning 
political groups.108 Democrats, on the other hand, tended to support political groups that 
had strong left-leaning democratic credentials and worked or campaigned on a platform 
of liberal social democratic ideas. That explains why labour unions in Poland and France 
received substantial aid from the NDI to further their activities. Private IRI and NDI 
funds were used to help in fronting political pluralism in countries the world over out of 
American “confidence in its own virtues and a conviction that democracy should be 
supported publicly and proudly,” according to Shipler of the New York Times.109 That 
proud advocacy for global democratization issued from Americans’ strong attachment to 
their democratic identity. That identity, according to Hunt, included values and beliefs 
about freedom that had an apparent rather than subtle effect on foreign policy.110 National 
ideology had the capacity to developed concretely to a point where it shaped the direction 
of U.S. foreign relations. 
One motivation for U.S. democracy promotion in the 1980s was the conviction in 
Washington that a global community of democracies would prevent war because 
democracies rarely go to war against each other. President Clinton argued later that, 
“Democracies don’t attack each other. Ultimately the best strategy to ensure our security 
and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere.”111 
Similarly, Henry Nau, an opinion writer, later summarized that there is “the need and 
opportunity to build democracies and free markets in the former communist countries and 
parts of the developing world. Because democracies do not fight one another, this policy 
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is not idealism but a realistic investment in national security.”112 These understandings of 
the relationship between American rule of law and global harmony essentialized and 
magnified U.S. values and institutions as the standard for the developing world.  
1.2.The Firming of Democracy Promotion: From the Bush to the Clinton Years 
The triumph of democracy over communism after the fall of the Berlin Wall popularized 
democracy among states that were coming to terms with a new global political 
environment. In Eastern Europe, democracies quickly sprang up in Poland, Hungary, 
Croatia, Romania, and Ukraine, among others, where previously the Soviet Union’s 
influence held sway. Of all the industrialized states of the north, the United States was 
looked up to as a lifeline for these countries who were casting aside an age of political 
oppression and embracing democratic change. The expectations were founded on 
America’s preeminence as the richest and most politically powerful state in world 
politics. Despite these Eastern European hopes, there were concerns about the level of 
enthusiasm the U.S showed towards this wave of democratic change.  
 The George H.W. Bush presidency responded to global post-Cold War 
anticipations in a variety of ways. While President Bush continued to push critical aspects 
of foreign policy such as leading the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
promoting democracy remained a key talking point in Washington’s shifting policies 
towards non-Western states. An important approach the administration adopted involved 
the twinning of democracy to aid in foreign policy. This new commitment, made possible 
through the ending of Cold War hostilities, encouraged Bush to request Congress “to give 
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him greater flexibility in allocating aid funds to help leaders who favor democracy”113 
The commitment was intended by the White House to help positively discriminate among 
states in U.S. aid programmes through presidential access to a contingency fund to 
further democracy advocacy around the world.114 At its core, the approach normalized the 
use of American aid to help regimes with domestic and foreign policies similar to 
Washington’s.115  
The fate of several Eastern European states such as Ukraine, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria were tied to this policy shift. Eastern European hopes were 
high that the U.S. would rise up to its promise of democratic global leadership after the 
end of the Cold War.116 These states needed funds to make a head start as credible 
democracies and Washington could not turn a blind eye to these newcomers who set 
about, in typical American fashion, setting up free enterprises, free press, free judiciaries, 
and independent election commissions. But the timing of Eastern Europe’s freedom 
proved disconcerting to Washington. The U.S. was battling rising deficits and political 
problems in Panama, an important state to U.S. trade connections with Pacific nations. To 
mitigate the economic pressure as well as fund East European democracies, Republican 
Senator Robert Dole (R-Kansas) proposed, in 1990, to cut foreign aid to the top ten 
recipients, particularly Israel and Egypt, to free up capital “in order to help less-favoured 
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democracies in Eastern Europe and Latin America.”117 The proposal was defeated 
through the powerful Israeli lobby on Capitol Hill. But those suggestions followed 
directly from Bush’s emphasis on grafting aid to democracy in U.S. foreign policy. 
Dole’s Democratic colleague, Senator Patrick J. Leahy also suggested a common ground 
between Congress and the White House to take advantage of “an historic opportunity to 
reshape our foreign aid to keep up with today’s changing world.”118  
A key motive for the extension of assistance to countries such as Poland, Ukraine, 
Romania and Georgia, was to give preeminence to U.S. global leadership. In the Wall 
Street Journal, Nau suggested that such assistance be used to showcase U.S. moral 
leadership in a distrustful world. In fact, Nau believed U.S leadership would be highly 
regarded because “the world tends to trust America’s leadership, over that of more 
homogenous societies, because America copes daily with ethnic and racial issues within 
its own society.”119 Nau’s understanding echoed Hunt’s argument that U.S. foreign policy 
was “rooted in the process of nation-building, in domestic social arrangements broadly 
understood.”120 Redeploying foreign aid for democracy emerged from a bipartisan desire, 
as seen in Dole and Leahy’s bipartisan consensus, to support new free societies and to 
cement the U.S. position as leader of the free world.  
 The firming of democracy promotion in early post-Soviet days in the U.S. was by 
no means restricted to organizations and politicians alone. Paul T. Haire, a former aid 
consultant at the USAID, suggested that the U.S. prioritize “countries that adopt reforms” 
when allocating aid. Reforms meant liberal democratic institutions since, in his words, 
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“the new emphasis in foreign assistance…political pluralism (free elections) and 
economic pluralism (free markets) has grown from the perception that one-party 
government and state-controlled economies have always become mechanisms for 
corruption and oppression.”121 To avoid continuing political repression in the post-Cold 
War period, the United States, it was thought, should support political and market 
reforms in developing countries. By 1991, the emphasis on aid had notched so high that 
Congress conditioned aid on progress in implementing liberal political processes in 
recipient states. For example, Congress declared that it would “provide aid once Angolan 
reforms take place” in response to Angolan President Dos Santos’ request for aid during a 
visit to Washington in 1991.122 The imposition of conditions for democratic reforms in 
return for aid constituted a growing broader consensus on the export of U.S. democracy 
to encourage African countries to continue their democratization.123  
Aid conditionality was not peculiar to the United States alone. As Catherine 
McArdle Kelleher recalls, conditionality also grew in importance in European Union aid 
programmes to countries in Africa in the 1990s.124 Closely tied to the U.S. and E.U. were 
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Van De Walle and Resnick indicate 
that aid conditionality for democratization became possible because the U.S. used its 
voting power and control of these global financial institutions to strengthen 
conditionalities for aid to sponsor its political will around the world.125 But, as 
developing world leaders became more accountable to donors, democracy suffered 
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because the focus of political authority was not to the people but to the external financers 
of democratization and development programmes. Moyo, for instance, shows 
convincingly that aid programmes like the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) rather 
undermined democracy and the mass basis of the rule of law in Africa.126 Such 
programmes undermined democracy through their insistence on accounting to donor 
bodies rather than the people affected by the assistance programmes.  
 Concerns with democracy expansion did not mean the U.S. doled out money to 
nations that organized elections and held presidential inaugural events. Rather aid came 
in many forms such as food aid, military aid, and facilitation of programmes for capacity 
building normally led by American for-profit agencies. Some assistance aimed to help 
better the agricultural and nutritional needs of recipients. These included equipment for 
large scale farm mechanization. These kinds of support helped many governments in the 
developing world tackle famine in places like Ethiopia. The democratic shift in many 
countries also compelled African leaders to expend aid resources on larger political 
coalitions to remain politically relevant in places like Ghana where the SAP initiative 
reached every nook and cranny of the country. That spread of the gains of aid is in line 
with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith’s contention that democracy impels 
leaders to spread state resources for the benefit of more people in order to win political 
power.127  
Following the widespread developing world demand for democracy, U.S. 
administration officials broadened the scope of aid to include, among other things, “seed 
money and technical advice to build the institutions of democracy and capitalism. They 
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(recipient states) need to learn how to organize political parties and parliaments and a 
free press.”128 Similarly, U.S. private think tanks such as the NDI and IRI supported pro-
democracy aid campaigns from the mid-1980s in the developing world. 
The end of Cold War hostilities raised the question of whether U.S. influence 
would facilitate democratic growth and consolidation in Africa as much as in Eastern 
Europe. Many, such as journalist Michael Clough, argued that “with the end of East-West 
competition, the world has changed in ways that will make it possible for democracy to 
succeed in South Africa and in the rest of Africa.”129 As it turned out, those expectations 
were not unfounded because many countries in Africa quickly initiated political reform 
programs. In 1988, Ghana launched its decentralization process, a prelude to full scale 
democratization after about a decade under military rule. Elections were held in 
December 1992 and a new government was sworn into office in January 1993. This 
embrace of democracy, marked by elections, was felt in other countries such as Senegal 
in 1993, Ivory Coast in 1990 and 1995, Cameroon in 1992, and Malawi in 1994.130  Some 
of these elections were not entirely free or fair. In certain instances, election outcomes 
were reversed as happened in Nigeria in 1993 because the results were unfavourable to 
the incumbent military government. After the military organized elections won by a 
prominent opposition figure, Chief Mashood K.O Abiola, the military leadership 
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annulled the results and arrested the winner.131 It would take another six years for that 
country to try another democratic transition.  
 Democratic drawbacks in places like Nigeria dimmed hopes of many progressive 
Africans about the entrenchment of the rule of law on the continent. Optimism was 
further dampened among Western observers that the growing indifference of the West 
jeopardized Africa’s democratic switch at the end of the Cold War.132 The perceived 
American neglect of Africa was the result of greater emphasis in Washington on helping 
Eastern European democracies. While the U.S. supported Eastern Europe, the African 
share of American assistance shrunk. That those reductions took place in an era of 
promising political change in Africa displeased many watchers of U.S. Africa policy and 
bolsters Schraeder’s argument that U.S. policy towards Africa was inconsistent 
throughout the Twentieth century.133 For example, notwithstanding Botswana’s sustained 
credentials as a democratic state, U.S. assistance to that country was paltry after 1995. 
Not until 2003 did Botswana regain favour in Washington’s aid disbursement. In 
contrast, Ethiopia enjoyed weighty financial assistance from the U.S. throughout the 
1990s, despite its struggles with democratic transition. Keith Griffins explains this 
disparity in the fact that Cold War and early post-Cold War assistance were more 
political than economic.134 Given Ethiopia’s geopolitical significance for U.S. military 
power in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, American conditions for aid were less 
insistent on democratic reforms compared to less strategically valuable countries. A 
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disconnect thus existed between the firming of democracy promotion in Washington and 
actual financial incentivization from the U.S. for countries such as Ghana, Botswana, and 
Benin working to achieve democratic cultures and systems. As one African pundit put it, 
“the values so long preached by the West were being realized in fact, and many…naively 
thought that the West would have shown patience in nurturing democratic movement.”135  
 Democracy promotion went through an evolutionary process beginning in the last 
decade of the Cold War. Realist political thinking shaped much of the policy from 
Reagan to Clinton. The White House, the State Department and Congress contributed in 
acknowledging and fastening democracy promotion to broader U.S. post-Cold War 
foreign policy. But it was the end of the Cold War that provided ample opportunity and 
ability for the U.S. to pursue, preach and demand democratic change around the world in 
return for food, military, and other forms of assistance. The allocation of assistance to 
other countries was done to supposedly further the expansion of a democratic world 
community, assure U.S. leadership of a freer world, and create a more peaceful post-Cold 
War global environment. The consensus of both Democrat and Republican law makers 
and presidents to consistently support a single line of policy demonstrates that democracy 
promotion was a bipartisan and truly national policy. 
 As has been shown in this chapter, much of the discourse that led to the rise in 
prominence of democracy promotion in U.S. policy in the 1980s and early 1990s 
emerged from policymakers in Washington. The source of their inspiration, though 
multifaceted, stemmed largely from the American democracy and political experience as 
well as the context of the Cold War. This echoes Hunt’s position that the concretization 
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of democracy in U.S. foreign policy emerged from shared values and ideology held by 
the American elites and the public. The constant theme of American democratic export in 
speeches and comments further highlights the continued belief in American 
exceptionalism which supports Stewart’s assertion that the claim to exceptionalism drove 
U.S. foreign policy making. Foreign policy, particularly, the promotion of political 
ideologies abroad, was built on the shared national values, beliefs, experiences and 
history of the country. African countries such as Benin, Nigeria, and Botswana, while 
making strides at democratic consolidation, received varying levels of U.S. assistance 
which in many instances contradicted the new, emerging consensus at home in the U.S. 
over the promotion of democracy in foreign policy. 
Though the U.S. couched its democracy as the standard ideal for universal 
adoption, target states did not always construe democracy in such terms. In the next 
chapter, I use empirical evidence to examine whether U.S. foreign assistance programmes 
reinforced or rewarded democratic reforms in developing countries in Africa. Using 
foreign aid and trade data from the USAID and the U.S. Census Office respectively, the 
chapter examines how Ghana, Zambia, Benin and Botswana’s share of U.S. assistance 
was informed by their press freedom performance and elections records.  
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CHAPTER 2 
U.S. AID AND DEMOCRATIZATION, 1990-2001 
“We can help ourselves by helping the best African leaders demonstrate to their people 
that the benefits of democracy are not theoretical, but tangible.” Madeleine Albright, U.S. 
Secretary of State, 1999.136 
 
Scholars such as Tijen Demirel-Pegg and James Moskowitz suggest that U.S. foreign 
policy after 1990 reinforced the use of aid to endorse democratic state building  around 
the world.137 Those endorsements motivated some dictators such as Blaise Campaore of 
Burkina Faso, Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya, and Paul Biya of Cameroun to hold elections 
in their countries either to gain global political credibility or necessitate genuine 
democratic reforms. This chapter discusses the Ghanaian experience of U.S. aid within 
the context of its democratizing initiatives. By comparing Ghanaian press freedom scores 
to its aid receipts from Washington, this chapter explains how aid correlated to 
democratic progress in ways that furthered the rule of law or otherwise. To deepen the 
explanatory power of the analysis, we add three other countries, Botswana, Zambia and 
Benin, to provide a layer of comparison through which to fully understand the processes 
and ambiguities of post-Cold War American aid programmes in Africa. This approach 
improves our ability to effectively analyze the politics of aid and democratization and 
 
136 Curled From BBC, “Approve African Growth Act-Albright,” Daily Graphic, October 27, 1999, 1. 
137 Tijen Demirel-Pegg and James Moskowitz, “US Aid Allocation: The Nexus of Human Rights, 
Democracy, and Development,” Journal of Peace Research 46, no. 2 (2009): 181–98. Demirel-Pegg and 
Moskowitz argue that American aid was used as a conduit to influence countries to better their human 
rights and rule of law performance. Similarly, Benhard Reinsberg argues that aid givers, particularly 
bilateral aid donors, rewarded regime change and democratic transition in recipient states after the Cold 
War. See Bernhard Reinsberg, “Foreign Aid Responses to Political Liberalization,” World Development, 
Political Conditionality and EU Foreign Aid, 75 (November 1, 2015): 46–61, 
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deepen our knowledge of the ways in which aid either reinforced democratic trends or 
betrayed American rhetoric of democracy promotion in the post-Cold War period. 
2.1. Aid for Democracy in U.S. Africa Policy: Some Post-Cold War Evidence 
In 1993, leading Ghanaian minds like media practitioner Nana Essilfie Conduah claimed 
that any American support for Ghana’s democracy was because of the “switch from the 
British Prime Ministerial inheritance to a hybrid of American Executive Presidency.”138 
But such  observations failed to acknowledge that at the time of Ghana’s Fourth 
Republican transition, there was minimal assistance from the U.S. towards the whole 
exercise. Indeed, it took U.S. ambassador to Ghana, Kenneth Brown’s persistence for the 
USAID to send a team to Ghana to assess the ground for some form of democracy 
assistance in 1992.139 This does not mean overall American assistance ceased. Rather, 
specific U.S. foreign aid allocations for democracy activities and advancing the rule of 
law were not as pronounced as Conduah and others thought.  
 When Washington eventually decided to send in democracy assistance to Ghana, 
American initiatives focused on helping create resilient state institutions that could act 
independently. That is why the first major U.S. support for Ghana’s democracy in the 
post-Cold War period went to the Ghanaian parliament in 1993. To strengthen 
parliamentary governance, the American government sponsored a familiarization tour of 
Washington for select Ghanaian lawmakers in August that year. The tour gave the 
Ghanaian lawmakers an opportunity to observe “how the legislative system operates at 
 
138 Nana Essilfie Conduah, “Democracy...with a Little Help from a Friend,” The People’s Daily Graphic, 
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the state and local levels” as part of learning the ropes of legislative work.140 The leader 
of the Ghanaian delegation was Mohammed Ibn Chambas, first deputy speaker of the 
house. Other members were Owusu Agyeman, minority leader, Gladys Boateng, member 
for Tema West, Steve Akorli, member for Ho East, and Hawa Yakubu Ogede, member 
for Bawku East. The members’ experience of the Congressional process informed their 
future legislative success. Some of them, like Hawa Yakubu Ogede, became prominent 
activists for the opposition in the Ghanaian parliament as well as key voices for women 
activism outside parliament. Ibn Chambas left parliament in 2002 as one of the 
experienced minds who helped put the young Ghanaian democracy on a strong footing. 
The experience he gained was later put to wide use at the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) where he championed economic cooperation and political 
stability in the West Africa sub-region from 2002 to 2006. 
Collaborations like the 1993 tour enabled the Ghanaian parliament to gain 
understandings of the American style of institutional democracy in addition to the 
Ghanaian experience of parliamentary democracy to firm the practice of the rule of law. 
That combination of systems of knowledge both local and foreign resulted in Ghana’s 
infant democracy withstanding the shocks such as intense opposition dissatisfaction, 
trade union demands, and the struggle over electoral reforms. Politicians aside, journalists 
and opposition activists in Accra gained relevant knowledge from strategy conferences 
with others around the continent. The International Republican Institute, for instance, 
organized a major continental democracy conference in Gaboronne, Gabon on February 
2, 1993 to promote mostly right-wing political strategies and activities across the 
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continent.141 At the gathering was Ghanaian media practitioner Asare-Donkoh. The IRI’s 
presence in Africa demonstrates American commitment to export distinctively U.S. 
ideologies to supposedly fertile, new frontiers open to the advancement of the rule of law. 
The IRI’s work aimed at teaching African actors what partisanship meant within U.S. 
political contexts with the expectation that participants would adopt such approaches to 
party and consensus building at home. Similarly, the NDI had their own foreign policy 
agenda in promoting liberal, left leaning democratic forces and activities in Africa.  
 Furthering support for institutional growth in Ghana, the U.S. National 
Conference of State Legislators (NCSL) funded the training of senior parliamentary staff 
to increase their capacity for legislative analysis, administration, procedure, and 
management.142 Aptly captioned, “Parliamentary Staff and Institutional Development,” 
this October 1993 workshop came under the auspices of the United States Information 
Service (USIS), one of the agencies that promoted U.S cultural presence around the 
world. Such political sponsorship, limited as it was, supports Fareed Zakaria’s assertion 
that American backing of democracy elsewhere stems from convictions at home about 
the “the appeal of their culture and ideas,” to the rest of the world.143  
It was in October 1994 that the most significant democracy assistance ever from 
Washington  to Accra was launched.144 This Ghana-U.S. agreement was a multi-million 
dollar funding programme spread over four years to strengthen “broad participation in 
 
141 Asare-Donkoh, “Democracy and Human Rights.” 
142 Debrah Fynn, “Workshop for Senior Parliamentary Staff,” Daily Graphic, October 4, 1994. 
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Foreign Affairs 87 (2008): 18–43. 
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free, fair and transparent elections in Ghana’s elections scheduled for 1996.”145 The 
overall amount was $10, 150,000, subject to the availability of USAID funds for the 
purpose. Major areas of focus included “voter education, preparation of a new voter 
registry and voter identification, institutional strengthening of the Electoral Commission, 
training and orienting voting observers, and providing other electoral support.”146 The 
allocated capital was channeled directly to institutions of democratic governance, in this 
case the Ghanaian Electoral Commission. A major driving force behind the financial 
package was Ambassador Kenneth Brown who previously pressed Washington for 
assistance for “firm support for democratic transition…over the objections of the 
USAID.”147 As a result, a team of assessors was sent to Ghana from Washington to study 
the possibility of extending some form of help. After the study, USAID pulled together 
funding from a variety of sources to support the electoral process among participants in 
Ghana. The main reason for the funding was the belief, later espoused by Madeline 
Albright, Secretary of State, that “there is no question that we can help ourselves by 
helping the best African leaders demonstrate to their people that the benefits of 
democracy are not theoretical, but tangible.”148 
Around the same time, in the mid-1990s, Washington committed a bigger budget, 
about $85 million, to prop up democratic transition across Africa.149 This package was 
part of $1.2 billion of overall foreign assistance to African countries. However, the 
meagre commitment of $85 million to democracy in a $1.2 billion overall aid package 
confirmed continued U.S. commitment to development over democracy assistance 
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programmes. This emphasis on development did not help advance Albright’s goal of 
using aid to help democracy in African countries. The failure was in stark contrast to the 
wave of democratization which was taking place across the continent. That is why 
Kenneth Jost observed that there was a disconnect between rhetoric and actuality in the 
U.S. policy of democratization in Africa.150 Indeed, the Republican controlled House 
sought to revise the $1.2 billion funding for Africa in the mid-1990s downward despite 
the fact that this allocation to Africa was less compared to other regions receiving 
American assistance.  
Though the 1994 U.S. democracy aid to Ghana was encouraging, it was by no 
means the only form of financial support for the electoral process in Ghana. The final 
Ghana-U.S. agreement acknowledged that “based on experience…the USAID expects the 
government of Switzerland, Great Britain, Canada, Germany, France, and the European 
Union to provide assistance in various forms” over the course of preparations towards the 
1996 elections.151 In fact, Washington estimated that $1.9 million would be contributed 
by the Danish Development Agency (DANIDA) alone. This American recognition of 
other aid contributors to democracy showed the U.S. valued a multifaceted approach to 
democracy support and that the Americans alone could not establish nor entrench 
democratization on the continent. 
Another non-American contributor to the electoral process in Ghana during this 
time was the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FEF). So prominent was the FEF that 
its presence in the country generated mixed reactions from different sections of political 
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society. Yaw Ayeboafoh captured the varied responses to the FEF when he recalled that 
in the pre-transition era the FEF had been “detested like a vermin. But it has been one of 
the most consistent funding agencies for the operations of the Interim Electoral 
Commission- a legacy bequeathed to the Electoral Commission.”152 The FEF held 
numerous capacity building programs in the post-transition years to deepen the 
participation of voters and better the managerial and political skills of independent 
electoral institutions and politicians. For example, it funded the compilation of the book, 
Making Democracy Work in the Fourth Republic, in 1994.153 Earlier, in June 1993, a 
seminar under the same title had been sponsored by the Foundation at which speakers 
addressed the subject of democracy through papers which became the substance of the 
new book. The Foundation also organized a workshop on “Institutional Linkages and 
Enhanced Democracy” at Akosombo from July 7-9, 1994 to discuss issues on democratic 
consolidation.154 There were many other programs the Foundation paid for or carried out 
on its own to expand the boundaries of democratic culture in Ghana. The FEF’s activities 
in democracy activism were successful in that a core of Ghana’s civic activists benefitted 
from its empowerment programmes.  
While the Americans and some Europeans contributed to democratic institutional 
growth in Ghana, the Canadian government added its own support through offering to 
provide short tours of its parliamentary institutions to Ghanaian MPs to enhance their 
law-making capacity.155 Britain equally extended help by inviting speaker of parliament 
Justice Daniel F. Annan to Westminster in late October 1994. Ghana’s British Council 
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preceded this with a training workshop for 32 Ghanaian journalists from both the private 
and public media with funding from the Thomson Foundation in the UK. These efforts 
from numerous countries reinforced the broad nature of encouragement that was invested 
in Ghana’s democratic transition. Though the 1994 contribution from Washington of over 
$10 million provided much needed financial cover for electoral and political institutions, 
other aid partners made some contributions to democracy promotion in Ghana. More 
importantly, these foreign donor programmes were by no means the main boosters of 
democracy in Ghana. The mass of financial commitment and human investment in 
Ghana’s democratization process came from the government of Ghana and the Ghanaian 
voters, civil society groups, and the clergy. As William Plaff suggest, “civil society 
makes democracy possible. Without it, democracy has failed and will continue to fail in 
Africa.”156  
In the chart below (Figure 1), data on the full U.S. assistance to Ghana, Zambia, 
Botswana and Benin are captured from 1990 to 2001. Next, there is another chart (Figure 
2) on press freedom scores for those countries. Comparing data in both charts, helps us 
understand how much aid was informed by press freedom performance in order to 
explain how the United States used its financial power to encourage democratizing 
countries to stay on course.  
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Figure 2.1  
U.S. Aid Values for Ghana, Benin, Zambia, and Botswana from 1990-2001 
Courtesy: USAID’s Trend Data Site, 2018. Figures represent absolute million values of 
all assistance programmes.   
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Figure 2.2 
Press Freedom Scores for Ghana, Benin, Zambia and Botswana 
 
 
Courtesy: Freedom House, 2019. (1=Free; 2=Partly Free; 3=Not Free). 
 
As can be seen from the figures, U.S aid for Ghana was high compared to its press 
freedom scores as a measure of its commitment to the rule of law in the 1990s. The 
Ghanaian media, still contending with perceived limitations from the military era, was yet 
to reach its full potential. Though journalists in Ghana were not dragged out and 
summarily executed, the spread of the private press, while developed, rarely came close 
to matching the effective dominance of the public press over coverage in the country. 
This was largely the result of the funding gap between state media and the private press. 
Until 1994, the broadcast media in Ghana remained restricted with no access for private 
citizens to acquire frequency modulation spaces for broadcasting.157 Despite these media 
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restrictions, Ghana gained far more aid from Washington than Botswana. Botswana, on 
the other hand, performed consistently higher on the ranking in press freedom and held 
elections that returned a popular ruling party back to power. Yet, early post-Cold War 
U.S. assistance to Botswana, though better than mid-1990s to 2001, did not confirm the 
narrative that American support favoured states with credible democratic practices. 
Explaining the numbers for the early post-Cold War for Botswana, Jeff Gow calls 
attention to the fact that Botswana’s high HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of 35% encouraged 
external donors to pay more attention to this health epidemic than the less pressing issue 
of democracy.158 That attention to a national health challenge took much of the shine 
away from other equally pressing democracy programmes. But granted this, American 
aid, democracy and development related from the USAID, was never encouraging for 
Botswana from 1996 to 2001. The Republican Congress’ tendency to cut down assistance 
programmes to Africa also meant cuts for small countries like Botswana.159 From 1996 to 
2001, Botswana never received above $5 million of U.S. aid per annum. In total, 
Washington shipped $14.4 million of aid to Botswana from 1996 to 2001. In the same 
period, Zambia received $248 million, Ghana $509 million, and Benin $190 million. But 
as can be seen from the Figure 2, Botswana outperformed these countries as a democracy 
in guaranteeing the freedom of expression. Nonetheless, it received far less support 
compared to these other states.  
 
158 Jeff Gow, “The HIV/AIDS Epidemic In Africa: Implications For U.S. Policy,” Health Affairs 21, no. 3 
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this view. For details on Congress’ aid cutting intentions, see Jost, “Is Democracy Taking Root in Sub-
Saharan Africa?”  
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One explanation for the aid disparity is trade volumes the countries recorded with 
the U.S. from 1992 to 2001 as presented in Figure 3. Botswana performed far behind 
Ghana and Zambia in trading volumes with the United States. It posted higher volumes 
than Benin. However, Benin fared better in attracting U.S. aid in the last half of the 
1990s. One plausible reason is that the American-French jostle for influence in 
Francophone Africa created favourable conditions for Benin’s improved aid gains. Aside 
that, Ghana and Zambia’s share of assistance point to an interplay of larger U.S. 
economic interest in those states because of their positive trade relations with the United 
States.  
Figure 2.3 
U.S. Trade Volumes with Ghana, Zambia, Botswana, and Benin from 1992 to 2001 
  
Courtesy: U.S. Census Office, 2019. https://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/balance/index.html 
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Washington’s policy in the post-Cold War era in order to sustain prosperity at home.160 
Despite the American propensity to emphasize security and commercial ties over 
democracy, the Ghanaian state continued to evolve its media and polity, building stronger 
institutions and allowing for better public engagement in furtherance of the rule of law. It 
was this that led the Rawlings administration to liberalize the airwaves for media practice 
in 1994.161 It was not until 1997, however, that media liberalization went full steam 
across the country. The slow, measured nature of media liberalization came about 
because the ruling Ghanaian elites consciously guided the pace and form of that 
liberalization.  
Zambia followed Ghana closely in holding an unenviable record of cautious press 
liberalization implementation. Yet, Zambia, like Ghana, managed to attract sizeable 
amounts of American assistance.162 Even Benin, a comparatively smaller country with 
emerging free institutions, registered aid amounts that outweighed Botswana’s assistance 
figures in the last half of a decade. In a larger sense, the disconnect between 
Washington’s professed democracy promotion and foreign aid gets clearer when Nigeria 
is examined. Until the 1999 elections, Nigeria represented a test case of worsening 
political leadership in Africa. But immediately after the 1999 elections, Albright, U.S. 
Secretary of State, assured Olusegun Obasanjo, the Nigerian president, that the U.S. 
would increase aid to “assist Nigeria to transform into a democracy…The increase from 
$27m, would make Nigeria the largest recipient of U.S aid in Africa.”163 At the same 
 
160 Schmergel, U.S. Foreign Policy in the 1990s. 
161 Alhassan, “Market Valorization in Broadcasting Policy in Ghana: Abandoning the Quest for Media 
Democratization.” 
162 See U.S. aid numbers in figure 3. 
163 Curled From BBC, “Nigeria Promised More U.S Financial Support,” Daily Graphic, October 21, 1999. 
 
 
59 
  
time, Botswana, probably the best example of a free, democratic state, fared poorly in its 
ability to attract U.S aid.   
Though U.S. foreign assistance helped, to some extent, expand the boundaries of 
the rule of law in Africa, the allocations were not always used to laud the most vigorous 
democratizing states like Botswana. This disconnect between professed policy and 
execution contradicted the American convictions in its democratic leadership. As Obed 
Asamoah explained in 1995, this was “unfortunate because Africa has found expression 
in the establishment of constitutional rule in country after country” at a time when 
“expected volume of assistance has never been forthcoming.”164 Comparing Ghana to 
Benin, Botswana and Zambia bolsters the notion that assistance was not necessarily used 
to establish and entrench the rule of law in democratizing, developing states. Given 
Ghana’s abysmal press freedom record relative to other states like Botswana, a logical 
outcome would have been for it to have receive lesser assistance. The improving press 
freedom in neighboring Benin, particularly after 1996, would have ideally led to 
increased grants. On the contrary, Ghanaian receipts almost always doubled Benin’s 
annual figures in that period while equally outstripping Botswana’s. Although trade 
relations have been explained as a plausible factor for Ghana’s experience, another 
motivation was the country’s faithful commitment to implementing economic reforms 
under the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). The admiration Washington had for 
Ghana may have further accounted for Accra’s positive aid relationship with the U.S. in 
the 1990s.165  
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The table below provides information on the election history of the four countries 
used for comparison in this chapter.  
Table 2.1 
A Table Detailing Post-Cold War Elections in Ghana, Benin, Zambia and Botswana 
Country Number of    
Elections 
Regime 
Change 
Years of Elections 
Benin 5 1 1991, 1995, 1996, 2001 
Botswana 3 0 1989, 1994, 1999 
Ghana 3 1 1992, 1996, 2000 
Zambia 3 1 1991, 1996, 2001 
Courtesy: African Elections Database, 2018. 
 
Benin held a referendum on constitutional changes on December 2, 1990. This was 
followed by national assembly elections on February 17, 1991 and presidential elections 
in March 1991. The 1995 and 1999 polls were national assembly elections that sent 
representatives to the national assembly. In 1996 and 2001 presidential elections were 
held. Nicephore Soglo lost the presidency to Mathieu Kerekou in Benin in the 1996 
presidential elections. Benin continued to practice this parliamentary system of electoral 
democracy beyond 2001. In Ghana, the 2000 election was won by the opposition New 
Patriotic Party (NPP) with a coalition of other smaller parties.166 The ruling Movement 
for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in Zambia changed leadership in the 2001 elections 
and won the election that year. Except Botswana, all three countries experienced regime 
change between 1990 and 2001.  
These regime changes helped normalize the transfer of political power without 
violence. But, as has been noted, the continuous progress some African states made in 
implementing the spirit and letter of the rule of law did not necessarily translate into 
 
166 New Patriotic Party was Ghana’s main opposition party in the 1990s. It came into power in 2001 on the 
back of a campaign promising change after nearly twenty years of John Rawlings.  
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favourable U.S. economic assistance. For instance, despite Albright’s plea to the U.S. 
Congress to “give an important hand up to African leaders who have been reforming and 
modernizing their economies and give new reasons for others to do the same,” Capitol 
Hill took more than a decade to finally pass the African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA on May 18, 2000.167 This act extended duty free access to the U.S. market for 
African textile producers to increase trade volumes between the U.S. and Africa.168 
Though the AGOA benefitted both U.S. and African economies, the slow pace of its 
development echoed perceptions that Congress had African concerns on the back burner. 
Indeed, these perceptions of neglect led Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way to conclude that 
the United States deliberately exerted effort at promoting democratization in Central 
Europe and the Americas rather than in Africa and the former USSR states in the post-
Cold War period.169 
2.2. The Ghanaian Reaction to the Politics of Assistance  
As the main contributor to the democratization process, the Ghanaian government 
retained control over the electoral process and its financing. Ghanaian decision makers 
responded to U.S. aid as well as other donor support for democratic governance in two 
ways. Firstly, Ghanaian institutional recipients often commended the donors for their 
help while collaborating to account for the expenditure of allocated capital. Secondly, 
leaders aimed to limit donor presence and intrusion into the work of their institutions.  
A highly debated programme of support was the 1994 USAID assistance of 
approximately $10 million of direct funding for Ghana’s electoral reforms prior to the 
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1996 general elections. In providing this assistance, the American embassy passed the 
money through U.S non-governmental bodies to undertake most of the activities planned 
as part of the package. Vehement opposition to USAID’s approach came from the 
Ghanaian government. Government spokespersons like Tony Aidoo insisted that 
“USAID…cannot be allowed to drive the…proposal for electoral changes” because 
elections were matters of sovereignty which no external bodies should interfere with.170 
The government thus signaled its unpreparedness to abdicate responsibility for leading 
and managing the process of electoral reforms to donor agencies. Aidoo wanted the 
Electoral Commission to manage and disburse a $741, 000 component of the fund  to 
training party agents at polling stations despite the USAID’s preference for an American 
company to undertake the training exercise.171 Aidoo hoped that managerial and 
administrative control through the Electoral Commission would “eliminate the 
expenditure of a large part of the funding in the high fees that would be payable to US-
based NGOs.”172 The Ghanaians hoped that local civil society groups, governance 
institutions and statutory bodies would lead the process of democratic reform even if 
some funding for those endeavors came from outside institutions. The opposition to the 
awarding of contracts to mostly U.S. based NGOs became so hotly contested that Ekow 
Spio-Garbrah, Ghanaian ambassador to the U.S., did not shy from raising objections to 
such aid conditionalities in a May 1996 speech at Capitol Hill.173  
 
170 Tony Aidoo, “The Search for Free and Fair Elections,” Daily Graphic, August 1, 1994. Tony Aidoo was 
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 Ghanaian recipient institutions of U.S. aid also exhibited resistance to donor 
intrusion into their managerial space. Many heads of local statutory bodies saw aid as 
stifling their ability to function independently of donors dictates. In 1994, a key head of 
the Electoral Commission of Ghana came out to publicly reiterate the independence of 
the institution in the face of perceived pressures from the USAID following the allocation 
of funds to the commission for electoral reforms.174 This reminder from the Electoral 
Commission revealed the complex impact of aid on the institution’s autonomy. The 
complication arose from the USAID’s insistence on a parallel expenditure scheme for aid 
money. Given the quality of its human resources, the elections management pedigree it 
garnered from 1988 onwards, and its national reach, the Ghanaian Electoral 
Commission’s confidence in its own abilities were not misplaced. The commission also 
felt that opposition parties were pressing it in ways that denied it some measure of 
autonomy in carrying out its functions. In insisting on its independence, the Ghanaian 
EC’s indicated that any talks with aid givers and political parties were not binding on the 
commission. The Commission thus grew distrustful and uncomfortable with the means 
through which foreign assistance programmes were transmitted to it as well as attempts 
by donors to set the managerial agenda for the commission.  
 Apart from the problems with foreign assistance for political organizations, 
Ghanaian citizens like R.B.W Hesse, a media commentator, challenged popular western 
perceptions that Africa received voluminous and generous assistance packages. When 
contrasted with trade losses African states went through, foreign assistance packages 
paled in relevance, according to Hesse.175 He also decried unfair trade relations with the 
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West which he argued were more detrimental to the economic rise of the continent than 
was acknowledged. Hesse thus called for a policy shift that put fairer trade terms with the 
U.S. on the table in international relations. He explained that “Africa’s plea is for trade 
not aid.”176 Yet, this plea did not seem to have an effect since aid continued to dominant 
U.S.-Ghana economic and political relations. 
The evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates that Washington’s aid 
programme was not in sync with its professed commitment to advancing democracy 
abroad. On the contrary, trade and other factors dominated the nature and form of U.S aid 
allocation in ways that undermine the perspective of the current literature that the U.S. 
led in promoting democracy in developing countries after the Cold War. As the evidence 
shows, relatively large aid recipients like Ghana did not live up to the same democratic 
ideals as countries like Botswana which received lesser assistance. Washington’s aid 
choices focused on reinforcing its economic ties with recipient countries and gaining 
strategic advantages in Francophone Africa. Economic and strategic political 
considerations thus took precedence over the Americans’ stated goal of promoting 
democracy on the continent.  
There was also deep ambivalence towards foreign assistance in Ghana in the 
1990s. Ghanaians raised concerns about whether donors’ support was aimed at genuinely 
enhancing democratic growth or furthering donors’ own ends. Ghanaian leaders did not 
allow aid to undermine their ability to continue to guide the process of political and 
democratic governance. Leaders such as those at the Ghanaian Electoral Commission, 
politicians, and concerned citizens recognized that it was the Ghanaian people themselves 
who must be responsible for the control of the politics of the state and that no amount of 
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external assistance should warrant an abdication of that role to non-Ghanaian entities 
irrespective of the form and quantity of financial assistance injected into Ghana’s 
democratic cause. In the next chapter, I explore Ghana’s internal politics and the way 
Ghanaians construed democracy and external influence in its transition as a democracy as 
well as the consolidation of its democracy. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE GHANAIAN TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIZATION, 1988-1992 
“No country can develop with only one person’s thought and without a real discussion.” 
Adama Sangare, a patent medicine vendor at Bamako market in 1993.177 
 
This chapter explores the Ghanaian democratic experience in the post-Cold War global 
political environment emphasizing the localized nature of democracy promotion during 
the transition and how post-transition politics and society reflected a commitment within 
the country to make democracy work. Non-partisan actors, among them farmers, trade 
unionists, scholars, and professionals, pushed the frontiers of the new democratic 
experiment despite the seeming dominance of politicians who attempted to drown out the 
agency of the larger society. At a local level, citizens’ concern with democracy 
promotion was transactional because rural people expected that their efforts in 
establishing democracy would lead to improved social and economic wellbeing. Such 
dedication to democratic change demonstrates the importance of Ghanaian rather than 
foreign influences on democratization in Ghana. The local Ghanaian leadership of the 
democratic process, the widespread Ghanaian knowledge and appreciation of the rule of 
law, and the national mass involvement in the transition to democracy in Ghana 
undermine the American perspective that democratization was a replication of Western, 
specifically U.S. forms of institutions and processes.  
 
 
 
177 Howard W. French, “In One Poor African Nation, Democracy Thrives,” New York Times, October 16, 
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3.1. Ghana: A Brief Background 
Ghanaian contact with the West began in 1492 when the small coastal community of 
Axim welcomed the first Portuguese sea trading ship. Afterwards, the Dutch, Danes, 
Prussians, and English settled and traded in the then Gold Coast, a name given the 
territory for its large deposits of gold. Though European merchants established permanent 
presences in castles and fortresses along the coast for both legitimate trade and the 
infamous slave trade, official governance relations did not emerge until 1844 when the 
resident leader of the company of merchants, George Maclean, signed a bond with a few 
coastal chiefs abdicating greater judicial power to the British courts on the coast.  
In the 1850s, concrete steps were effected to legitimatize that colonial relation 
with indigenous coastal Fante and Ga people. Like the United States during the 
revolutionary war, taxation became the first issue of contention between coastal Ghanaian 
communities and the English crown’s attempt at exercising political suzerainty over the 
people. Until then, the shared coastal trading space between the English and the Dutch 
worked in locals’ favour as they could play one Western power against another to sustain 
their autonomy. No European power could exercise concrete law making, taxation, and 
policy implementation power over the indigenes due to this inbuilt political mechanism 
local chiefs used to oppose European colonial attempt.  
All this changed in 1852 when the other European powers left the Gold Coast 
selling off all their assets to the British. In that year, Governor Stephen Hill of the Cape 
Coast Castle held a meeting with local Fante chiefs where he suggested the idea of a poll 
tax. In later meetings with other chiefs in southeastern Ghana, Governor Hill convinced 
them to consent to the tax in order to raise about £20,000 (about £2,768,943.28 in 2019 
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value) to provide social amenities for towns and communities in the Gold Coast. Local 
dissatisfaction with misuse of the tax proceeds and the lack of effective representation of 
the masses killed the tax policy. Sensing growing European intrusion into local political 
and social spaces, the coastal Fante chiefs reacted. Chiefs in the Fante enclave formed a 
union, The Fante Confederation in 1868, to safeguard the autonomy of the coastal states. 
Made of up numerous native authorities, the Confederation had an executive council and 
legislative body elected by member native authorities. It was, however, short-lived due to 
internal power politics among chiefs and growing disinterest in its activities from some 
native authorities that had earlier joined. Nonetheless, it taught the people a semblance of 
indirect electoral democracy through its legislative council.  
In later years, the British colonial authorities restricted indigenous representation 
on political institutions. Despite this, Gold Coast nationalism persisted in demanding 
increased representation of mass interest in local politics. Another important nationalist 
group during this classical stage of nationalism was the Aborigines Rights Protection 
Society (ARPS) formed in 1897. It opposed attempts at vesting unused Gold Coast lands 
in the British crown among others. Groups like the Fante Confederation and the 
Aborigines Rights Protection Society raised political awareness and mobilized in ways 
that deepened indigenous desires for freedom and direct political representation in the 
Gold Coast.178  
 
 
 
178 For further details, see Francis Kwamina Buah, A History of Ghana (Macmillan, 1998); David Kimble, 
A Political History of Ghana: The Rise of Gold Coast Nationalism, 1850-1928 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1963); Antony N. Allott, “Native Tribunals In The Gold Coast 1844—1927,” Journal of African Law 
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3.2. The Growth of Ghanaian Constitutional Government 
Though agitations for representative democracy in Ghana date back to the nineteenth 
century, it was the Guggisberg Constitution that guaranteed some elected seats for towns 
in the colony in a new legislative council in 1925.179 The Guggisberg Constitution also 
established town councils with members popularly elected. However, Guggisberg’s 
constitutional work was promptly opposed by radical nationalists because it failed to 
grant full elective representation for communities and towns in the new national 
legislature.180 In 1948, a new constitution promulgated by British Governor Allan Burns 
expanded unofficial Ghanaian representation on the legislative council. Nevertheless, 
mass agitation against that constitution compelled colonial authorities to draft a new one 
in 1951 which allowed for thirty-three members of the legislative assembly to be directly 
elected by the people. But local activists rejected this constitution since chiefs were given 
the power to appoint thirty-seven members. Thus, by 1957 when Ghana gained 
independence from Britain, the Ghanaian political story was dotted with practical 
experiences of political opposition, press activism, elections, and representative 
democracy that prepared much of the country for self-government.  
 Post-independent Ghana oscillated between democracy and military rule. After 
the 1966 military coup that ousted the democratic administration of Kwame Nkrumah, 
the conservative, Kwesi Abrefa Busia took over as Prime Minister. Within two years, 
Busia was overthrown by Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong. The military junta of 
Acheampong and later Lieutenant General Fred Akuffo were ousted in a June 4th, 1979 
coup led by Jerry John Rawlings, a junior army officer. Right after the putsch, the new 
 
179 Buah, A History of Ghana, 1998; Kimble, A Political History of Ghana, 1963; Allott, “Native Tribunals 
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180 Buah, “A History of Ghana.” 
 
 
70 
  
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) returned the country to civilian rule under 
the economist Dr. Hilla Limann in October 1979.181 On December 31, 1981, Rawlings 
returned to the scene in another coup citing a need to remedy the worsening economic 
conditions under the civilian government of Limann. For close to two decades, Rawlings 
defined Ghanaian politics and led, for the second time, a return to civilian rule in 1993. 
3.3. The Mass Nature of Ghana’s Fourth Republican Transition 
Four years before the 1992 parliamentary and presidential elections, there was an earlier 
district assembly election which elected representatives to local government authorities. 
This 1988 decentralization policy had two major aims: to enable rural people to decide 
the issues that directly affected their lives and to boost local ownership of development 
initiatives at the grassroots level.182 The democratic decentralization of power established 
a blueprint for a national transition to a more inclusive, democratic system of 
government. Decentralization’s effect on the political consciousness of Ghanaians was 
far reaching. The local assembly elections reinvigorated citizens’ interest in the 
democratic process, cravings that had laid dormant in the post-Nkrumah years except for 
brief spells of democracy in 1969 and 1979.  Decentralization also created a sense of 
ownership of the country’s destiny among citizens in ways that altered the perceived 
aloofness which had characterized earlier government-citizen engagements. At the 1992 
constitutive assembly in Accra to draft a new constitution, the political awareness 
brought about by the 1988 local government reforms was proved by the active 
involvement of rural people such as farmers, fishermen, and petty traders in crafting a 
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national constitutional document that balanced the interests of key sectors of the social 
and economic system.183 
 Ghanaian citizens facilitated a smooth election process in the lead up to the 1992 
general elections in a variety of ways. In the absence of widespread broadcast technology 
in the 1990s, chiefs, opinion leaders, and the clergy led the way in spreading important 
information on events on the political calendar to citizens and encouraging them to 
partake in such exercises for the national good. The military’s political power, one can 
argue, had diminished the chiefs’ and the clergy’s influence thus motivating the latter to 
wholeheartedly endorse the return to normalcy under a civilian administration. It was not 
surprising that members of the National Commission for Democracy (NCD) leaned on 
traditional leaders to spread important notices about voter registration to the people.184 In 
December 1991, Mr. N.K Baidoo, a commission member of the NCD, urged community 
chiefs to “beat gong-gong to remind all eligible voters to register to enable them to 
exercise their civic rights.”185 Galvanizing people through chiefs expanded the 
participatory nature of the electoral process and bolstered political awareness in rural 
communities. Aside chiefs and government publications, election officials sought to 
engage people at the grassroots through circulars to churches, mosques, and youth 
 
183 Peter Arthur, “Democratic Consolidation in Ghana: The Role and Contribution of the Media, Civil 
Society and State Institutions,” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 48, no. 2 (April 1, 2010): 203–26, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14662041003672510. 
184 The NCD was the transitional body responsible for the registration and exhibition of the voters’ register, 
educating people on the electoral system, and doing preparatory work for the whole political process and 
events leading to the general elections of 1992. The NCD was dissolved when the Independent National 
Electoral Commission was set up on November 12, 1991 as the country’s main elections management 
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groups.186 In effect, clergymen like Reverend Robert O.A Okine, Anglican Bishop of 
Koforidua-Ho Diocese, were encouraged to advise their congregants to get involved in 
the constitutional process outlined by the independent Interim National Electoral 
Commission.187 The direct involvement of traditional and religious authorities deepened 
local ownership of the transition process. This embellished the democratization process in 
Ghana with a domestic character which validates Mbaku and Ihonvbere’s assertion that 
much of the African democratic change in the 1990s was predominantly localized rather 
than external.188 More broadly, the localized, community-led democratization in Ghana’s 
transition challenged American assumptions that democratic change was a function of the 
U.S. aid initiatives and political maneuvering in developing countries. As the political 
history of Ghana demonstrates, interest groups such as the clergy and chiefs appreciated 
the stability that African forms of democracy provided for citizens.  
 The domesticated democracy transition in Ghana extended so far hinterland that 
officials confirmed the depth of participation rural voters showed in the process. Mr. 
Baidoo was impressed, for instance, with “high figures recorded at some of the centres, 
especially in rural areas” when he visited far off communities to monitor on-going voter 
registration exercises in 1991.189 He encouraged many potential voters to come out to 
register for their voters’ identification cards ahead of the 1992 general elections. The 
participation of rural communities in the transition process illustrated political interest 
and awareness on their part which added to the success of the transition process. That 
 
186 Carly Ahiable and Patrick Super Nyembe, “Provisional Register to Be Exhibited, December,” Ghanaian 
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passion for democracy among Ghanaian rural people did not stem from external 
influences such as Voice of America or the British Broadcasting Cooperation. In fact, 
there was no widespread broadcast technology in the 1990s to reach such places. The 
determined involvement of citizens could therefore be attributed to a genuine 
commitment to political change on the part of Ghanaians who had gone through many 
years of military than democratic rules. Home based political experience was therefore a 
far more important stimulus for democratization than U.S. aid or influence. 
 Widespread party activism in the early 1990s also pushed the political boundaries 
further to include people on the fringes of political society. Academics, working 
professionals and civil servants equally demanded a return to constitutional rule and 
remained steadfast in their demands for genuine rule of law that put citizen liberties at the 
heart of constitutional governance. Even while the 1992 constitutional draft was on-
going, the annual New Year School at the University of Ghana, Legon, called for an end 
to ethnic politics to help sustain the new democracy.190 The recommendation did make it 
into the final constitutional draft through various provisions made for constituting a 
government of national character. Political parties, mainly opposition groups, also 
organized under an Alliance of Democratic Forces Ghana (ADFG) to demand greater 
transparency, competence and impartiality from independent bodies responsible for 
aspects of the transition process.  
By July 1992, the ADFG was clamoring for wider coverage of eligible voters in 
the voter registration exercise. The alliance insisted that the Interim National Electoral 
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Commission (INEC) expand logistics and personnel to more communities to register 
more voters.191 Given the long Ghanaian history of voting, party organization, and 
partisanship, it was not surprising that the ADFG ferociously opposed perceived 
disenfranchisement of sections of the population in these early stages of democratic 
transition.192 Such activism in the face of military dictatorship held the government to 
account and limited the possible control of independent institutions by a military 
government accustomed to giving orders and commanding obedience.  
Partisans’ watchfulness over the INEC and other independent bodies equally gave 
these institutions an air of freedom from government intrusion because of the weight of 
citizen power that political parties commanded and their potential to exert that power on 
the military government if the latter tried to influence independent state institutions. This 
political party attentiveness furthers Rakner’s and Lotshwao’s explanation that foreign 
assistance to accountability groups like political parties may strengthen procedural 
democracy by enabling parties watch and inhibit executive excesses.193 In Ghana’s case, 
political groups, and civil society actors were asserting their autonomy by watching the 
ruling elites closing in the dying days of military rule. The independence of action on the 
part of organized Ghanaian political forces without external support revealed the 
relevance of localized leadership and ownership of the process of democratic change. 
 In 1992, the intimations of citizen power were already being felt in the media. In 
response to the early end of voter registration, Grace Addo, a concerned citizen, pointed 
out, “This is most unfair and I think the Electoral Commission must do something about 
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it immediately.”194 Another writer, Isaac Arthur, appealed to the authorities to explain 
what would be done about those who did not meet the deadline.195 These citizens clearly 
understood the power of their votes to change the trajectory of the country’s political 
future and wanted to be part of that change. Other Ghanaians added their call to how the 
new democracy should thrive and sustain itself. While acknowledging that Ghana had to 
copy what others did in building sustainable democracies, Ebo Afful, a voter, advised 
Ghanaians to look to the “creativity and the best experts…in the country” for inspiration 
in crafting a workable constitutional architecture for Ghana.196  
 Afful and others departed from the traditional narrative that Ghanaian 
constitutional experts, like other developing world scholars, should use U.S. democracy 
as a model for casting their own forms of political institutions. In fact, the rejection of 
western style democracy, for Afful, required Ghanaians to see “democracy as an 
educational process that is attained through true understanding of the culture of the 
people, infinite patience, and precise attention to the values and sentiments of the 
people.”197 Self-worth was integral to the construction of a democratic national identity 
and the public did not want a photocopied version of another country’s constitutional 
documents, practices, and institutions in the name of democratization. Rather, they 
sought a more practical, workable constitutional and democratic system that solved 
Ghanaian problems and assured them the opportunity to attain the material progress 
achievable under a peaceful democracy. This understanding of democracy contrasted 
sharply with the American enthusiasm evident in statements by Nau, Atwood, Lake, and 
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Clinton that the U.S. needed to export democracy to the developing world.198 Ghanaians 
clearly showed confidence in their own abilities, self-worth, experience and national 
character to create and sustain a workable democracy. 
 Policymakers like P.V Obeng, one of the most influential minds in the Provincial 
National Defense Council (PNDC), held the view that developing countries did not 
necessarily see democracy in the Westminster style.199 Politicians and the public in 
Ghana looked beyond Western forms of democracy for a bouquet of constitutional 
options that could sustain the democratizing initiatives at home. Another leading figure in 
government, Dan Abodakpi, a deputy secretary for Trade and Tourism, believed that the 
stability sought in democracy could not be achieved by simply copying foreign 
models.200 True to these considerations, the final constitutional document made 
innovations that were uncharacteristic of western models. For instance, it required the 
institution of a Council of State, a kind of elder statesmen chamber, to advise the 
president on critical national issues such as appointments to independent state bodies.201 
The concept was derived wholly from the advisory role of elders in Ghanaian indigenous 
political systems. In the traditional system, elders of state from clans, chiefdoms, and 
royal lineages served in an advisory council to the chief on matters of judicial 
settlements, customary practices, and the finances of the kingdom, chiefdom, or state. 
Indigenous politics therefore contained inklings of democratic governance and political 
checks from which a modern state could extensively borrow. The constitution also 
banned chiefs from active politics so they, the chiefs, could focus on their core spiritual 
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and cultural function as foci of unity and national identity.202 It was these innovations that 
people such as P.V Obeng and Ebo Afful wished to see in Ghana’s experiment in 
constitutional government.  
The public interest in deciding what type of constitutional system to adopt spoke 
to intense local democratizing efforts unhitched in any way to U.S. or other Western 
democratic exports. Ghanaians were imbedding their unique historical experiences into 
the form of democracy they desired.  In doing so, they showed political autonomy in 
ways that Washington perceived to be absent in the developing world where the U.S.  
thought it was promoting democracy. The denial of local historical conditions in U.S. 
democratization advancement in many states was one of the many criticisms against post-
Cold War Washington foreign policy.203 In Ghana’s case, local efforts in crafting a 
constitution defied the American belief that the adoption of U.S. political institutions and 
processes implied genuine democratization.   
 In Ghana, the amplified popular participation in politics prevented the army from 
excessive use of power in the last days of the transition. The military junta, led by 
Chairman Jerry John Rawlings, recognized that the regime’s quest to transition Ghana 
into a democratic force depended on “the healthy relations it had with the totality of 
Ghanaians.” Popular participation improved so that that military intimidation lost its full 
potency in limiting citizens’ political buoyancy. The military government thus adopted a 
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policy of loosening its grip over the political space to enable a smooth democratic 
transition.204 
 Also, Ghanaians’ promotion of democracy at home took cognizance of larger 
issues which democracy promotion from the U.S. missed. One of the “MORTAL 
DANGERS” [sic] that Llyoyd Thompson, a concerned citizen, cautioned against was that 
the new democracy might become weakened through cynicism, apathy and neglect.205 
The campaign against indifference accounted for greater public interest in the affairs of 
the transition process in ways that placed ordinary citizens at the fulcrum of the debates 
over policy. The opposition parties and the incumbent military junta, which later 
metamorphosed into a civilian political group, contested policy issues to gain the appeal 
of the masses. Public interest fed this contest of ideas between political parties and the 
incumbent elites in state-owned media. In the political section of the Daily Graphic, for 
instance, all four of the leading political parties were evenly represented in expressing 
their concerns or ideas before and after the general elections. For a military government 
seeking democratic transition to contend with opposition groups for political advertising 
space in state-owned media implied not only opposition confidence in the political 
environment, but the ruling military’s surrender to growing public interest in free public 
space for political exchanges. The state media accommodation of varied policy opinion 
speaks to the high professionalism and autonomy of the Daily Graphic and Ghanaian 
Times as public service media bodies. As well, it shows the extent to which the military 
regime wanted to invest in democracy as they prepared for the transition.  
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Political parties’ collective participation in the political process made public 
education possible on matters such as the constitution, political obligations of citizens, 
and the extent of rights granted under the Fourth Republic.  Groups like the teachers’ 
association in Damongo lent their energies to promote democracy through education on 
the constitution.206 They distributed free copies of the abridged constitution to the pupils 
of junior high schools in rural areas to create awareness of the new document. That 
education deepened the rule of law by enabling many young people to read, understand, 
and imbibe key aspects of the constitution.  
 More radical citizens went further to advocate that political rather than military 
actors populate the political space in the lead up to the election. Disdain of military rule 
had become so pervasive that prodemocracy forces in Ghanaian universities and 
professional bodies did not wait for the end of the transition to hold the first human rights 
conference in Accra to discuss the issues of “human and civil liberties,” as well as how to 
safeguard them.207 Lawyer Akoto Ampaw, a private legal practitioner, led the New 
Democratic Movement (NDM) to press for complete military withdrawal from the 
political space because, in his view, military visibility in political discussions did not 
inspire confidence in the political process.208 The NDM went as far as calling for a new 
transitional government to take over from the military government until elections were 
conducted. It also required that paramilitary bodies such as the Committees for the 
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Defense of the Revolution (CDRs) be disbanded. Human rights, rule of law and free 
political activities stood at the heart of demands from these groups.  
These calls for respect for human rights, limitation of military visibility in 
partisan politics, and a freer press or media were local initiatives that came from citizens 
committed to ending the failed attempts at military rule. The call by Ghanaian political 
actors for lesser military involvement placed Ghanaian agency at the centre of political 
change and activities in the democratization process in Ghana in ways that made external 
presence complementary to indigenous efforts. Ghanaian agency in the democratizing 
process reinforces Van De Walle, Mbaku and Ihonvbere, and Hearn’s assessment that 
home-grown democracy activists are more effective at sustaining democratization in 
Africa.209 American commitments, while commendable, did not gain traction in 
influencing or changing the course of Ghana’s democratization process. There was a 
disconnect between what Americans saw as their role in advancing democracy and the 
locals’ understanding of the political transformations they were leading.  
3.4. The Ghanaian Response to the End of the Cold War 
The fall of the Berlin Wall sent cautious optimism throughout the world. In Ghana, 
however, policy makers were forced to rethink their approach, politics, and worldview in 
matters of international relations. In Ghana’s budget for 1992, the finance minister, 
Kwesi Botchwey, gave the clearest indication of how the country felt about the end of the 
Cold War when he recognized that the Soviet Union’s collapse caused economic 
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dislocation for the former COMECON.210 He added that “In consequence, both the 
United States and the European community are giving priority to the economic 
reconstruction in eastern Europe, which will inevitably entail reduced flows of 
concessionary finance and private investment to Africa and other developing regions.”211 
Acknowledging this policy implication for Ghana at the end of the Cold War positioned 
the Ghanaian administration to respond to the new political dynamics in the world. 
One obvious apprehension, for Ghanaian leaders, was the evaporating capital 
flow, resources that had been largely responsible for the government’s ability to 
implement the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). These funds also helped a 
follow-up programme called the Program of Action to Mitigate the Social Cost of 
Adjustment (PAMSCAD).212 The leadership recognized that not even becoming the star 
pupil of structural adjustment in Africa could attract foreign direct aid or other forms of 
concessionary finance after the Cold War. Added to this, the SAP widened the gap 
between the rich and poor in Ghana as well as impoverishing the urban core of 
bureaucrats and low income earners whose productivity and purchasing power oiled the 
 
210 Kwesi Botchwey, “The ’92 Budget Statement and Economic Policy (1),” Ghanaian Times, February 3, 
1992. The COMECON, formally, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, was a group of Communist 
states under Soviet leadership after the Second World War. Though an economic relationship of Eastern 
European states, the COMECON was the Soviet attempt at countering the American use of the Marshall 
Plan to win European states to its position in the Cold War.  
211 Botchwey, "The '92 Budget Statement and Economic Policy (1)". 
212 The Structural Adjustment Programme under Ghanaian head of state, Jerry John Rawlings, started in 
April 1983. It put restrictions on government expenditures with critics saying that it affected the poor the 
most. Between 1983 and 1992, six International Monetary Fund programmes were implemented by Ghana 
to restore fiscal discipline, improve the value of the local currency and assure macroeconomic stability. 
Following the criticism, the government embarked on the Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Cost 
of Adjustment (PAMSCAD). For details see Kwame Boafo-Arthur, “Ghana: Structural Adjustment, 
Democratization, and the Politics of Continuity,” African Studies Review 42, no. 2 (1999): 41–72, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/525364; Kwabena Donkor, Structural Adjustment and Mass Poverty in Ghana 
(Policy Press, 2002), 
http://policypress.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1332/policypress/9781861343956.001.0001/ups
o-9781861343956-chapter-9. 
 
 
82 
  
economy and assured growth.213 It was to remedy these problems that PAMSCAD was 
created and implemented. Though the SAP and PAMSCAD were well-intentioned to 
improve Ghana’s economy, they had the reverse impact of limiting social mobility and 
economic growth for the vast majority of the citizens.214 The realization that capital flow 
from the West was dwindling formed the basis of official government reaction and action 
at the end of the Cold War.  
In examining politics at the end of the Cold War, Thad Dunning, a professor of 
political science, asserts that the Soviet defeat hastened the democratization process in 
countries like Ghana.215 It is, however, debatable if that was the case with Ghana. Rather, 
one can argue that the Cold War amplified local Ghanaian commitment to a 
democratization process that was already underway since 1988 when local government 
elections were held to boost grassroot ownership of government. As Finance Minister 
Kwesi Botchwey noted, in reference to the  negative implications of the end of Cold War 
hostilities on African economies, “This is particularly unfortunate at a time when many 
African countries are in the process of reforming and re-structuring their economies and 
political systems.”216 In Ghana, a national consultative assembly was already in progress 
drafting a new constitution when the finance minister delivered the budget statement in 
1992. 
Popular understanding of the global geopolitical shift within Ghana also 
acknowledged the economic implications of Eastern Europe’s freedom on African 
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nations. Journalist Frank Asmah, writing in the Ghanaian Times, lamented the drying up 
of economic assistance and general trade concessions for Africa on the world stage after 
the Cold War. The situation was further complicated by Western diversion of “vital 
economic assistance from poor developing nations to provide support to the new 
governments in Eastern Europe.”217 Eastern European matters supplanted African issues 
in Western capitals in a way that cut back economic advantages for many African 
countries despite renewed efforts at constitutional reforms  
 In the post-Cold War environment, Ghanaian authorities actively shaped foreign 
assistance politics to address the concerns they had about the negative outcomes of the 
geopolitical shift on their economy. Ghana, for instance, joined other developing 
economies in 1991 to reject the United Kingdom’s proposal at a Commonwealth meeting 
to  conditionalize foreign assistance to the “observance of human rights or 
democracy.”218 The delegation from Accra, led by P.V. Obeng, reasoned that different 
countries would respond differently to the advent of democratization on the continent. 
For this reason, Obeng thought no hurried steps should be taken to coerce countries into 
political or constitutional reforms that they might not be prepared for.219 More 
importantly, the adoption of democracy did not mean states had to copy the specific 
systems of politics, practices, institutions and procedures of London and Washington. 
African states needed time to decide and mold what would be best for their particular 
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social and political contexts, Obeng argued. In Ghana, these arguments echoed a desire to 
forge resilient political structures with little external input. They also expressed deep 
awareness among policymakers that democratization needed local will-power to succeed. 
Building the blocks of transition to the rule of law on indigenous aspirations, enthusiasm 
and motivation, rather than American or any other form of external encouragement 
perpetuated liberty and freedom which Ghanaians could rightly own. By emphasizing the 
local leadership of the new political reforms, Ghanaian leaders undercut the U.S. 
perception of its role in these democratizing processes as well as the desirability of 
American forms of institutions and processes for developing states.220 
Nevertheless, the inherent values of political reforms differed from one African 
country to another. Despite these differences, the main motivation in every political 
capital was a desire to make democracy subservient to the larger development needs of 
citizens. Michael P. Besha, a continental trade union leader, advised that democratization 
in Africa should help people acquire and sustain long lasting development.221 He restated 
the ubiquitous belief that Africans must seek democracy not to please external powers but 
to better the material and cultural wellbeing of their citizens. Among the benefits 
democracy should help achieve were “food sufficiency, human resources development, 
capacity building and the eradication of poverty, ignorance, and diseases.”222 In the 
specific case of Ghana, there were endogenous socio-economic conditions such as 
crumpling infrastructure and economic challenges which animated Ghanaian 
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democratization advocates to challenge the status quo.223 In that context, external U.S. 
assistance alone could not deliver those economic and infrastructure goals because such 
expectations could not be realized through a large shipment of aid. Rather, local people 
disheartened at the unfavourable political and economic conditions at home stood up for 
a transformation that works. As Ali Mazrui, the Kenyan professor of politics, put it: “You 
can tolerate loss of freedom if you get prosperity in return. But loss of freedom and 
deepening poverty is not a very good bargain. And the African people have decided that 
enough is enough.”224  
This growing concept of a transactional relationship with democracy did more 
than external influences to expand the boundaries of free enterprise, the rule of law, and 
free press in Ghana.225 That transactional conceptualization of democracy gives credence 
to the assertion, made by Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and 
Fernando Limongi, that economic growth and democracy are bedfellows.226 In many 
ways, the presence of military, autocratic regimes in previous decades in Africa was 
largely due to the persistence of Western powers in developing cordial relations with 
strong men despite their poor economic management and human rights records.227 It was 
therefore logical that in the absence of external support for autocratic regimes, citizens 
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would stand up to demand efficient economic management and corresponding human 
dignity. The situation in Ghana was thus a consequence of the military’s failure to better 
the economic lot of the people.  
 
As has been explained in this chapter, the democratic transition in Ghana succeeded due 
largely to the involvement and enthusiasm of Ghanaians of all walks of life. The 
agitations, debates, negotiations, and compromises citizens made with each other 
expanded opportunities for peaceable democratic growth. Without this activism, the 
groundswell of support would not have been present for democratization, even if millions 
in American foreign assistance had poured into Ghana. External ideas, financial support, 
and technical additions were at best complementary to Ghanaian efforts at implementing 
constitutional forms of governments. The predominantly Ghanaian nature of the 
processes of reforms, the reforms themselves, and the enduring commitment to those 
reforms undermine the notion that the U.S. exported democracy norms to countries like 
Ghana with supposedly minimal understanding of the rule of law. In the next chapter, I 
examine the continuing effort at democratic consolidation as further proof that the 
Ghanaian political experience undercut Washington’s largely paternalistic sense of 
democracy promotion.  
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CHAPTER 4 
DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION: POST-ELECTION GHANAIAN POLITICS 
AND DEMOCRACY, 1993-2001 
 
In this chapter, I explore Ghanaian politics and the continuing efforts to safeguard 
democracy in Ghana after the 1992 elections. This analysis provides a lense through 
which to understand how democracy was consolidated as well as the role Ghanaians 
played in building and sustaining it. In the post-election period, Ghanaian democracy 
gained more meaning through the watchdog functions of parties, citizens and civil society 
groups.  The consolidation of democracy in Ghana highlight that democratization is an 
ongoing process whose success depends on local interests and their willingness to invest 
in continuing reforms. It further shows that foreign meanings of democracy cannot be 
used to sustain a democracy because local conditions and context define the choices of 
activists, leaders and the people. Ghana’s democracy consolidation essentialized the 
country’s experiences and context in ways that rejected American views and perceived 
impositions of U.S. models of democracy and the practice of the rule of law.  
4.1. The Growth and Consolidation of Democratic Institutions 
The events after the 1992 elections in Ghana, while boosting confidence in the return to 
multiparty rule, highlighted deep interest in consolidating the gains of reforms. There 
were, however, hotly contested spaces among interest groups throughout the post-election 
years. In the lead up to the next elections, opposition parties and sympathizers raised 
issues with many aspects of the process. These concerns included the voters’ register, the 
duration of registration, and the ability of the Interim Electoral Commission to manage 
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the elections without executive influence. Such concerns eventually caused some glitches 
for the transition process and the main opposition party, the New Patriotic Party which 
rejected the election results as not credible.228 External observers, such as the 
Commonwealth election monitoring team and the Carter Center, were cognizant of some 
irregularities.229 Notwithstanding these concerns, these independent observers passed the 
elections as generally free and fair with mass participation.  
 In November 1991, the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) 
government had appointed an Interim National Electoral Commission (INEC) under the 
leadership of Dr. Yaw Afari Gyan to take over from the National Commission for 
Democracy (NCD). The administration went further to lift the ban on partisan politics on 
March 6, 1992 to pave the way for electioneering activities in the lead up to the 1992 
elections. Before the ban was lifted, opposition political elements had already started 
organizing under different names preparing for participation in the political process. 
Though the political opposition remained fragmented at these early stages of the 
partisanship process, they presented a formidable policy and advocacy opposition to the 
ruling military junta. In fact, their insistence to the INEC to compile a new voters’ 
register so irked the government that the Attorney-General made a reasoned response to 
their demands citing the high cost of a new register as inimical to the national interest.230 
The opposition also asked that both parliamentary and presidential elections be held on 
the same day to save money and assure credibility of the process. Though this idea was, 
in hindsight, very commendable, the INEC declined that proposition. It argued to the 
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contrary that there was no strong evidence that separate election dates for the presidential 
and parliamentary elections benefited the country financially. 
By mid-1992, many political parties went to national conferences to elect national 
officers or presidential candidates. This stage of Ghana’s politics was heavily crowded 
with many political parties. In the parliamentary elections, the National Democratic 
Congress (NDC), a party formed by leading members of the Rawlings military regime, 
and its partner, the National Convention Party, won an overwhelming majority of the 
seats. Though the NPP, the largest opposition party in the country, did not take part in the 
parliamentary elections, other parties such as the People’s Heritage Party (PHP), People’s 
National Convention(PNC), and the National Independence Party(NIP), picked up 
significant numbers of seats across the country in 1992. The political space was therefore 
highly saturated, allowing the incumbent the advantage of politically nullifying the 
fragmented votes of the opposition forces in key areas of the country. Although the 
proliferation of parties fragmented opposition forces it did not dim their visibility. Rather, 
it helped various politically active individuals and groups seek and find their political 
identity as a prelude to merger with likeminded groups to form stronger parties. For 
instance, the EAGLES Party and the New Generation Alliance (NGA) became part of the 
NDC, the ruling party that metamorphosed from the military regime.231  
 After the 1992 elections, the opposition parties decried the outcome of the polls 
accusing the NDC and the INEC of rigging the elections. The NPP under Prof. Adu 
Boahen refused to sit in parliament and declined participation in the transition 
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programme.232 The apprehensions of the opposition over the voters’ register before the 
elections among others were all early signs of probable non-cooperation which were 
never fully addressed satisfactorily. These parties hoped the U.S. support for the process 
would involve financing a new electoral register to assure a degree of expanded access 
for many citizens who were not captured by earlier registration exercises. This 
expectation was founded on a collaboration between a U.S. team and the INEC to study 
the voters’ register and to offer solutions on how to make it better suited to the needs of 
the upcoming elections. As part of the process, the U.S. embassy had pledged to help 
sanitize the register.233 
 However, the Ghanaian Attorney-General pointed out that “the hopes expressed 
by the ADF for external assistance towards that exercise was a mere illusion” because the 
U.S. aid for the register was only $550,000 (₵577,500,000 in 1994 values) a far cry from 
the required capital.234 Given that the whole exercise would had cost three billion 
Ghanaian cedis (U.S. $ 2,857,142.85 in 1994 values), U.S. support for the process was 
woefully inadequate.235 Despondent, some of the opposition parties, namely the New 
Patriotic Party, declined to partake in the parliamentary component of the elections. 
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Clearly, the democracy promotion rhetoric of Washington immediately after the Cold 
War did not prioritize African electoral reforms. The U.S. drag in financially supporting 
Ghana’s electoral reforms during the transition weakened American claim as front runner 
in the democratizing environment in the early 1990s. The lack of interest in helping 
African political reforms like Ghana’s case in 1992 only strengthens Schraeder’s, 
Clough’s, and Copson’s point that U.S. foreign policy neglected Africa for a long time 
throughout the Twentieth century.236 Even in the absence of Cold War strategic concerns 
in the 1990s, Washington’s priorities of engagement relegated Africa to the background 
at its crucial time of democratization.  
 Following the declaration of non-cooperation with the transition or participation 
in parliament, some opposition parties under the Inter-Party Coordinating Committee 
made up of the NPP, PNC, NIP, and PHP held a press conference stating their reason for 
boycotting parliament and the entire transition process.237 In spite of their non-
cooperation, the opposition parties pledged to promote and help expand the frontiers of 
democracy by holding the government accountable. Subsequent opposition protests over 
issues of public spending, taxation, and individual freedom all confirmed their 
commitment to the process. On the other hand, the ruling party appeared to have taken a 
long time to shed itself of its pre-transition inclination to use force. For instance, Alhaji 
Muhamdau Maida, Northern Regional Chairman of the NDC, while promising to 
cooperate with the opposition to observe the rule of law, added that the NDC would not 
“countenance destructive criticism and other activities that would rock the boat because 
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so much has been done already.”238 Statements such as these limited the capacity of 
government and opposition groups to arrive at common ground.239 Additionally, Maida’s 
statement indicated the lack of quick adaptation of the majority of the former PNDC to 
the dictates of democratic change. But, as would be seen later, the popular insistence of 
the people triumphed over such political interpretations of democracy. 
 The absence of the opposition in parliament was clearly a matter of concern for 
government because a democracy without multiparty activism would fail to attract 
international respect. Also, there was more to be gained from a multiparty parliamentary 
democracy than from a parliament dominated by the ruling party alone.240 For this 
reason, the ruling NDC proposed the idea of professional talks with the opposing parties. 
Kwesi Botchwey sent early signals to this effect in January 1993 at a teachers’ town hall 
meeting.241 The government realized that “some ideas may come from them that are 
better than what we have and if they are we shall accept them. When we are able to sit 
down and talk in a principled way with the national interest well defined, we are certain 
that we would be motivated not by sectional interest or gain, but with the loftier ends of 
national development.”242 Getting all sides involved in the new democracy thus overrode 
other partisan interests of the ruling party. President Rawlings even extended a 
conciliatory hand to all rival political parties in his 1993 inaugural speech, promising that 
the administration would: “continue to reach out to those groups which withdrew their 
participation from the electoral process because it is our aim to establish a culture of 
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tolerance, consultation and consensus-building based on mutual respect for one another 
and practical recognition that we are one people with a common destiny.”243  
Eventually, the NPP sent indications of its readiness to dialogue with government. 
The request was in response to parliament’s invitation for them to take part in the formal 
opening of parliament in April 1993.244 While a patriotic move from the NPP, elements 
within government took issue with the request. For J. Tony Aidoo, the opposition’s 
earlier rejection of the outcome of the polls made it unacceptable that they would now 
want to engage the administration.245 Political neutrals, on the other hand, decried the fact 
that the NPP’s absence was a huge loss for the country. Daniel Buor noted, for instance, 
that, “in view of the withdrawal of certain political parties from parliamentary 
election…parliamentary opposition whittled down to insignificance.”246  
These neutral complaints strengthened the NPP’s resolve to involve government 
in professional talks. The party reiterated its call through its chairman, J.B da Rocha, in a 
news interview on national radio on July 31, 1993. The ruling Progressive Alliance, a 
group of left leaning coalition parties including the main ruling party the NDC, welcomed 
the decision as indicative that the opposition conceded that peace, stability and 
development were key to national progress.247 Commitment to dialoguing for effective 
involvement in the democratic process assured full access to insightful criticism for 
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decision-making on major national issues. As President Rawlings complained during the 
transition the “absence of parliamentary opposition is a setback to progress.”248  
The change in posture of the NPP and other parties was due to early intimations 
of genuine independence they saw in the new democratic political institutions. For 
instance, the party won a writ at the Supreme Court challenging the legitimacy of existing 
members of the local government system to elect district chief executives under the 
Fourth Republic in 1993. 249 Justice G.E.K Aikens granted an interlocutory injunction on 
the local government elections process forcing the Electoral Commission to postpone the 
exercise.250 Similarly, the PNC filed a high court writ in April 1993 challenging the 
appointment of individuals by government for election as district chief executives. The 
writ was upheld. Such legal victories boosted the confidence of the parties that 
impartiality of institutions had come to stay and that engagement in the political space 
guaranteed them a hearing. In 1993, another writ was raised contending that the 
celebration of military holidays such the 31st December Revolution Day were 
unconstitutional under a democratic government. Again, the plaintiffs won. The president 
appeared unprepared for this new wave of institutional independence which challenged 
all he had known as a military head of state. Rawlings lamented that: “the recent narrow 
majority decision of the Supreme Court about the celebration of 31st December 
Revolution also raises fundamental questions about the scope of the Supreme Court’s 
function vis-à-vis the legislative powers of parliament and indeed the prerogative of the 
executive. The experience of constitutional democracies teaches that nothing is gained 
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from confrontationist or subversive attitudes from elements in any arm of 
government.”251  
While not what he expected, President Rawlings accepted the ruling but added that “we 
cannot allow that arm of Government to stage a coup d’etat against the other organs.”252 
Clearly, Rawlings was learning that there were limits to the exercise of executive power 
in a democratic system. His acceptance of the institutions’ independence of thought and 
opinion further boosted confidence in Ghanaian institutions of democratic governance. In 
this sense, abeyance of the rule of law differed vastly from the pre-transition era of one-
man rule during which the military regime ruled with an iron fist.  
In addition, the new democratic climate created a conducive atmosphere for press 
freedom in Ghana. In 1993, for instance, parliament locked horns with the Daily Graphic 
over a difference in opinion on a bill addressing child abuse. The national daily did not 
back down. In fact, the paper retorted that “it takes more than parliament to make laws” 
and that it was the responsibility of the press to let the house know its flaws because “if 
the drums are not after you, you say the beats are good.”253 The challenge to state power 
sent signals to opposition groups that there was change in the dynamics of the nation’s 
politics. The new media environment helped opposition groups position themselves to 
contribute to strengthening the rule of law. The work of the media and non-governmental 
groups show that even, without U.S. backing for democratization process in Ghana in the 
early 1990s, Ghanaian agency advocated, won, and consolidated the rule of law in ways 
that no external support could do. Ghanaian resourcefulness in the democratization 
process buttresses Griffins’ and Enos’s conclusion that foreign donor assistance does not 
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necessarily foster democratization.254 Rather, as Mbaku and Ihonvbere noted, 
democratization emerges from intense local aspirations and a commitment to attain those 
goals.255 
4.2. Democracy as Transactional: The Mass Expectation for Socio-Economic 
Change 
The resentment and political rivalry that plagued national level partisan politics was not 
felt as intensely at the local level. Instead, post-election Ghanaian society saw increasing 
cooperation and collaboration among constituents to press ahead with development 
needs. In the town of Obuasi, an interparty group was formed by local political parties to 
find ways of giving prominence to their needs on the national stage through their member 
of parliament (MP).256  Among concerns of the constituents were “the large army of 
unemployed youth roaming the streets of Obuasi; environmental pollution and the 
inadequacies of health, education, and housing facilities.”257  The interparty committee 
teamed up with the MP to find solutions to these problems while serving as a point of 
contact for people mobilization towards these efforts. For these citizens far from the 
centre of political decision making in Accra, the political reforms meant an opportunity to 
execute social, economic and political change in communities.  
Among civil servants, the advent of a new democratic experiment meant 
empowerment against arbitrary government fiscal policies like increases in fuel prices 
that caused hardship for many people. They subsequently rejected the finance and energy 
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ministries’ attempts at increasing the prices of fuel on the market in early 1993.258 The 
impact of the Structural Adjustment Programme in foisting unequal pay scales and 
unfavourable service conditions were already enough discomfort for many civil servants. 
These workers capitalized on the new freedoms and constitutional resources to oppose 
state policies hurtful to their economic wellbeing. 
 Post-election rhetoric also emphasized a need to work together towards the gains 
sought through democracy. Many Ghanaians hoped that the transition to democracy 
would translate into improved social and economic conditions and expanded 
opportunities for individual liberties. Like all other emergent democracies of the day, 
these goals were not new. But the way in which Ghanaians quickly adapted to the 
political shift and its meaning for their lives highlighted their awareness, maturity, and 
understanding of the complexities of democratic politics unlike places such as Nigeria, 
Gambia and Malawi where democracy suffered retrenchment. 
Alhaji B.A Fuseini, deputy majority leader of parliament, reminded his NDC 
party that “winning the election was just the start of real hard work that demands honesty, 
patience and loyalty which are often destroyed by intra-party feuding.”259 While palpably 
partisan, the statement underlines the shifting focus of the electorate after the elections in 
Ghana towards securing the public goods democracy had to offer for the vast majority of 
the populace. For instance, the Trade Union Congress (TUC) demanded parliament to 
reconvene immediately to discuss the 1993 budget due to the “growing public outcry.”260 
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The union expected that due to these concerns, the new speaker of parliament would have 
recalled the house to deliberate the issues citizens or the TUC had raised.261 They were 
implicitly demanding that democracy must have meaning for the bulk of the citizenry. 
This Ghanaian understanding of democracy as transactional show they were mature and 
informed about the power of democracy to change the conditions of their communities. 
Such a grasp of the meaning of democracy challenged the American view of developing 
states like Ghana as fertile places for the transplant of U.S. institutions and democratic 
culture. Developing countries like Ghana showed that they were well informed about 
democracy and its implications for their development and future. 
 In rural communities mostly unaffected by the complexity of national politics, 
farmers like Kofi Anto expected the new political shift to give them respite from 
unexplained economic decisions like price changes on the fuel market. When a journalist 
asked what he wished from government, Anto explained that “as a first step, they should 
reduce the price of kerosene. The whole district does not have electricity. As a matter of 
fact, every household in the district depends on kerosene and to increase the price means 
forcing us in the rural communities to over-contribute our quota to national 
development.”262 Evans Ababio, a trader, concurred, “we depend solely on kerosene, and 
if government wants funds for balancing budget and initiating development projects, it 
should not take most of it from us.”263 These rural farmers had no access to electricity or 
solar technology so increasing prices of kerosene, the only available fuel for lighting in 
rural communities, had dire repercussions on the economic balance of these areas. 
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Similarly, in the northern parts of the country, farmers appealed to government to 
review the prices of fertilizer to boost their agricultural output following changes in the 
commodity price of fertilizer in early 1993.264 They even requested the administration to 
consider the “reintroduction of subsidy on fertilizer to alleviate the effects of trade 
liberation especially on the privatization of the marketing of fertilizer on farming.”265 The 
electorate therefore expected political change to translate into meaningful transformation 
for the economic livelihood of their communities. Such an understanding of democracy 
as transactional defied the perception of developing countries as almost always politically 
underdeveloped in the minds of policy makers in places like Washington. For Ghanaian 
voters, the difference between a military regime and a democratic administration lay in 
the presence of opportunity in the latter to advocate, through threat of electoral rejection, 
for infrastructure, economic improvement and social change. 
 Moral institutions in Ghana also contributed to the changing political narrative 
after the elections. The clergy called for cooperation and togetherness among political 
parties in order to exploit the benefits of democracy. Rt. Rev. Francis W.B Thompson, 
Anglican Bishop of Accra, urged opposition parties and the ruling party to cooperate for 
the greater good of the country.266 Nana Anarfi Kokortoh, paramount chief of Hwidiem 
in the Ashanti Region, encouraged his people to tolerate each other’s political views 
“without any rancor or bitterness.”267 Believing that tolerance promised a better future, 
the chief asked them to eschew “misinformation and disinformation so as to allow a 
peaceful atmosphere to prevail” for the progress of the community and the nation as a 
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whole.268 The encouragement from these leaders was thus a double call for national unity 
and effective utilization of democracy for material improvement. Citizens and 
communities understood the opportunities and advantages democratic transition held for 
them; they intended to fully realize the potential embedded in that transition for 
qualitative improvement in their livelihoods.  
 The transition further strengthened political activism among the leading parties 
and other actors while empowering many neutral or apolitical individuals to amplify their 
voices in national dialogues over politics, economics and social issues salient to the 
nation’s wellbeing. Commentators such as Kofi Frimpong, Daniel Buor and Yaw Boadu-
Ayeboafoh wrote pieces in the dailies that expanded the scope of democratic debate or 
simply educated others on the constitutional resources available for protecting individual 
freedom.269 This enhanced individual liberties and the rule of law because citizens grew 
in confidence in their ability to challenge the state legitimately with full cover provided 
by the constitution. For example, where demonstrations in the 1980s were explained as 
advocating a return to democracy and in defiance of unlawful authority, the protests of 
the post-transition period were couched as lawful exercises of citizens’ rights under the 
1992 constitution. It did not require the U.S. or other developed democracies to pump in 
capital to educate Ghanaians on their rights or teach political parties how to effectively 
present a solidified opposition to government’s policy excesses.270 Ghanaian citizens 
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naturally took up the responsibility of advocating in favour of the free press, the right of 
assembly, and for a voice in what happened in the country. Contrary to Michael Clough’s 
conclusion that U.S. engagement offered a way to foster democracy in Africa, Ghanaians 
ardently fought for democratic values in the early post-transition years without much 
external assistance.271 
 As early as February 1993, the main opposition NPP launched an effort to better 
their visibility through effective discussion of national policy issues and continued 
political campaigns which were sold as a national tour.272 They set out to explain to the 
electorate their decision to pull out of the parliamentary elections and the rejection of the 
presidential election outcome. This helped boost the party’s popularity and showed that it 
was ready to serve a credible opposition role in the new republic. In honour of its pledge 
to keep the democracy vibrant through responsible opposition action, the NPP applied 
and got a permit to hold a rally in the Eastern Region as part of the national tour. 
However, the Ghana Police Service withdrew the permit citing earlier acts of violence by 
unknown men at an earlier party gathering as excuse for the rejection. While abiding by 
this rejection, the party, through Nana Addo Dankwa Akuffo-Addo, made known its 
“intention to jealously guide our existence.”273 “We will resist any improper, unlawful 
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attempt to curtail the life of the party,” the statement continued.274 The opposition NPP 
thus showed that it would reap the fruits of democratic change in organizing and 
expressing itself as it saw fit. Leaders of the party did not just caution government but 
also engaged the inspector of police and other heads of enforcement institutions to ensure 
that future denials of basic political rights did not occur.  
In practicing patience and faith in the developing institutions, Ghanaian 
politicians and interest groups contributed to advancing the frontiers of democratic 
governance. They did not advocate specific external political ideologies, foreign 
understandings of liberty, or other beliefs extraneous to the Ghanaian political and social 
context. Already entrenched indigenous democratization activities in Ghana determined 
political and social convictions that drove reforms in Ghana rather than external 
influences. Thus, while the promotion of liberty and democracy, as Michael Hunt claims, 
defined U.S. foreign policy, Ghana’s experience defies the notion that such exports were 
necessary for successful democratic state building in developing countries.275  
 Though the NPP was visible in the early struggles of opposition politics, it was by 
no means a lone voice in the political wilderness advocating for good governance. Other 
parties such as the PHP, PNC, NIP and the Democratic People’s Party (DPP) were all 
ardent, visible forces in opposing government excesses and in demanding greater 
accountability from public officers for the exercise of political power.276 At a press 
conference convened by an interparty group of NPP, PNC, NIP and PHP  in January 15, 
1993, the parties expressed their dissatisfaction with the electoral process.277 Leaders of 
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these parties included Dr. Hilla Limann, Prof. Adu Boahen, and Prof. Naa Afarley 
Sackeyfio. They were the crème de la crème of Ghana’s intelligentsia and provided 
deserving opposition to government.  
Similarly, a group of six parties in opposition demonstrated on February 16, 1993 
to register their opposition to the election results and the transition process. A number of 
the group’s members were arrested and detained by the police service for breaching the 
rules of public order.278 On February 19, 1993, the spokesman for the Joint Action 
Committee, Kweku Baako Junior, gave the government an ultimatum for the release of 
their members or the whole group would present themselves for arrest and prosecution. 
Arguing the Committee’s case, Baako Junior pointed out, “Our position is premised on 
the fact that the Fourth Republican Constitution…guarantees the right of all citizens to 
organize and participate in demonstrations against policies and actions of 
government.”279 The Committee was determined to not only appropriate all their 
constitutional rights but use them to further the cause of accountability and political 
transparency in the new democracy. The convictions expressed in such utterances came 
from the contexts of the Ghanaian political environment in the immediate post-transition 
era when citizens began testing the reach and limits of the constitution. 
Such ultimatums served to remind the ruling party of the limits of political power 
as well as the real political checks and balances opposition parties posed to the wrongful 
use of public resources. The political vigilance of the opposition and interest groups 
sometimes reached points of extremes. For instance, when political propagandists started 
spreading unfounded allegations that the government planned to assassinate opposition 
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elements and financiers, the NPP seized the opportunity to require the president to 
“reassure the nation that the use of political violence to intimidate and eliminate political 
opponents will not be tolerated under constitutional rule.”280 J. Agyenim-Boateng’s call 
on Rawlings to speak about those rumors furthered a narrative pursued by the NPP that it 
was the victim of intimidation, molestation, and bullying at the hands of ruling party 
officials.281  
Post-election activism therefore helped the new Ghanaian democracy 
accommodate divergent opinions. Ghanaian consolidation of democracy in the early 
Fourth Republic proved that aid donors’ support cannot replace genuine internal political 
ardor in strengthening the foundations of the rule of law. Unlike the case in Zambia, 
Ghanaian prodemocracy forces dug deep into their own resources to oppose state 
overreach.282 Those sacrifices solidified the Fourth Republican democracy in Ghana.  
 Post-election politics saw citizens engaged in ongoing conversations about 
democratic statehood and the limits of power. The public waded into the debate regarding 
the expanse and limits of state power over such issues as political gatherings and under 
what circumstances the police could deny or reject requests for permits for meetings by 
political parties. Some contributors to national debates like Kofi Akordor were of the 
view that “if a group of people want to demonstrate against a government policy or the 
other way round, it is not the business of any one to prevent the exercising of this 
democratic right.”283 Akordor and likeminded Ghanaians wanted to see a change in the 
political atmosphere in a way that differed from the military era when greater restrictions 
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were placed on those rights. The freedom of expression so dominated public discussions 
that panelists at the annual New Year School in 1993 devoted substantial time to 
discussing the matter. They made passionate appeals to the new democratic 
administration and the populace at large to have the utmost “sympathy and moral support 
for journalists to enable the mass media function effectively in the Fourth Republic.”284 
Press freedom benefitted not only political parties but society generally by enlarging 
government accountability and transparency. 
Subsequently, the government, heeding to these demands for accountability and 
transparency, appointed an Ombudsman on January 7, 1993 to further facilitate 
institutional consolidation in the fight against political excesses or the abuse of power. 
That move owed as much to the people’s efforts after the transition as it did to the 
executive’s initiative. The executive’s action was an early sign that the transformed 
ruling group were willing to listen to those directly affected by political decision-making 
in the country. They were committed to assure citizens and observers that democracy had 
come to stay.285 As Kenneth Jost notes, these assurances, in addition to institutional 
readiness and opposition tenacity, did more to enlarge democracy than foreign assistance 
programs.286 Larry Diamond points out that nothing consolidates a democracy better than 
an indigenous civil society and mass participation in the political space.287 The boldness 
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of Ghanaian political coalitions, state institutions acting truly independently, and rural 
citizens stimulated the political climate in ways that extended democratic culture and the 
rule of law in the early Fourth Republic. Those gains, Ghanaian-led as they were, 
challenge American views of their own efforts at democracy advancement in developing 
countries in Africa. 
Commenting on the Fourth Republic, Alex Hamah, an opinion writer in the 
Peoples’ Daily Graphic, appealed to his fellow countrymen to look within for answers to 
democratization and economic development.288 Commentators like Hamah believed that 
early attempts at democracy should be accompanied by a search for local solutions to 
local problems in order to assure a balanced development of the political systems of the 
continent. Hamah continued that: “apart from the necessity for establishing durable 
democratic institutions to uphold, nurture and sustain the entire democratic edifice, 
Africa’s political leaders and universities should find quick and lasting solutions to the 
problem of the misdirection of Africa’s economy due to over-reliance on foreign advisors 
and experts.”289 He continued that while UN prodemocracy initiatives in 1990s were 
laudable and commendable, African people themselves had to find local solutions to local 
problems. He thus advocated a predominantly indigenous approach to democratization 
without dismissing the necessity of external support in some areas. This indigenous 
approach to democracy did not endorse opposition belligerence as signs of political 
tolerance or maturity.  
Patricia Kubow argues that indigenous involvement in the construction of the 
meaning of democracy gave local people agency in ways that the undercut American 
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promotion of the North American type of democracy in developing states.290 That is why 
Ghanaian interest groups wanted to spread awareness of politics and citizens’ rights so 
that Ghanaians of all walks of life could partake meaningfully in state-building. For 
instance, women’s groups, recognizing the role of education in the rule of law, requested 
that many copies of the constitution be printed for distribution as part of mass education 
on constitutional government.291 Access to the constitution would, in the opinion of 
Beatrice Love Ashong, a women’s leader in the Greater Accra Region, help people “read 
and understand their rights and responsibilities.”292 That knowledge, she hoped, would 
lead them to assume ownership of the constitutional document. Prof. Adu Boahen added 
his voice to the call for the translations to be into Ghanaian languages to enable people to 
read, know their rights and understand their obligations to the state.293 Within the nation’s 
democratizing context, people identified and advocated the areas of need in an effort to 
strengthen the foundations of the rule of law. Ghanaian people were thus, well informed 
of the challenges and opportunities of constitutionalism in their country. 
 
As demonstrated in this chapter, the post-election atmosphere in Ghana was a mixed bag 
of interests and activities aimed at consolidating the foundations of democracy. The 
discourses and activism drew in all sectors of Ghanaian society including politicians, 
journalists, clergymen, chiefs and students. The national character of these dialogues and 
happenings highlight the pervasive nature of democratic culture in the early period. 
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Though plagued by coups, the Ghanaian people never lost a sense of political awareness 
and the motivation necessary to lead their own political reforms. The political 
engagements of the post transition days helped cast off the political reticence of the 
military years and opened the floodgate to expanded partisan and non-partisan advocacy 
that deepened the democracy of the country. These Ghanaian democracy efforts, which 
included apolitical groups, private citizens, moral society leaders, and the press 
consolidated the broad, mass-based nature of democratization, reinforcing the conclusion 
that Ghanaian democracy gained more from local people than from U.S. external 
involvement. 
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CONCLUSION  
 
This thesis explores how democracy headlined U.S. post-Cold War foreign policy as well 
as the politics of assistance in furthering the promotion of democracy. It also examines 
the extent to which American democracy promotion played out in U.S.-Ghana relations 
in the 1990s. Focusing on how Ghanaian social and political forces molded debates over 
the country’s transition and consolidation of the rule of law, the thesis challenges the 
assumption that U.S. democracy promotion efforts were responsible for the political 
changes taking place in that country. Instead, I have contended that democratization was 
made possible through Ghanaian agency and commitment to realizing the rule of law in 
ways that befitted the political culture and context of Ghana.  
 The discourse over democracy and its place in American history pervaded much of 
U.S. society in the 20th Century. The manifestation of that deep-seated confidence in an 
enduring legacy of rule of law and freedom was visible in the U.S. elite’s and public’s 
expressions about the civility, maturity, and universal desirability of American 
democracy. Such discourses were crystalized as national symbols that defined national 
choices on the world stage and it was through these symbols that citizens made meaning 
of their state and their relationship with other polities. American perceptiveness of their 
state as historically democratic, free and prosperous shaped their foreign policy 
formulations. However, the practical implementation of those policies in Africa was 
fraught with ambiguities, as shown in this project. 
 The American Cold War tendency to prioritize economic and strategic relations 
over political ones in external affairs was still noticeable in the post-Cold War era. This 
made democracy promotion sometimes seem like rhetoric employed when moralizing 
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about bad governance in some African countries. Much of American post-Soviet foreign 
policy still placed security and economic concerns above democracy promotion, even if 
unconsciously. While Washington tried to present an image as a champion of democracy, 
its choices and actions when democracy was at stake did not always substantiate its 
prodemocracy rhetoric.  
 Eventually, democracy promotion was repositioned in a way that subjugated it to 
the security and economic choices of the U.S. government while allowing it to remain 
dominant in public discourse on American foreign policy. During the Cold War, 
democracy linked American security and economic commitments to countries such as 
Japan and South Korea. In the post-Cold War era, the United States’ decision to broaden 
ties with other states always depended on the economic and security advantages that 
those state presented to American interests. Democratization, therefore, became a means 
to the security and commercial ends sought by the United States. This way, Washington’s 
Cold War and post-Cold War foreign policy goals and actions were synchronous. 
 In the 1990s, Washington’s decision makers’ external policy choices sought to 
supposedly tie adoption of American style free institutions to economic assistance 
programmes to help spread U.S. national political ideas to developing states. These 
foreign policy goals were therefore grounded in domestic American ideology, norms, and 
values. However, as has been demonstrated, construing democracy in those domestic 
terms for export was not actualized in countries like Ghana where the peoples’ own 
interpretation of the concept of democracy held sway. Target countries like Ghana had 
local peculiarities and contexts that defied the transplanting of U.S. style democracy 
hook, line, and sinker. The constitutional modifications Ghana made in its Fourth 
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Republican Constitution signaled that universal concepts of democracy were adapted to 
suit the Ghanaian context towards serving the political and administrative needs of the 
country. 
 The Ghanaian democratizing context, led by the Ghanaian people, undermined the 
U.S. conviction that it was exporting democracy to African states. Such an American 
perception robs countries like Ghana of their political agency in choosing and designing 
the political system they prefer to live in. Ghanaians’ instrumentality in domestic 
democracy promotion surpassed external aid from the U.S. in the process of transitioning 
and consolidating the rule of law in the country. Ghanaian commitment, even under 
military rule, to stand up for democratic reforms shows that foreign aid would not 
succeed in building democracies and sustaining the rule of law unless local people show 
leadership, interest, and dedication to the principles of political change and democratic 
accountability.  
 Using the case study of Ghana, the historical evidence indicates that democracy 
was not imported, imposed or copied from the United States. The Ghanaian people 
understood democratic tenets and led the way in creating and implementing a 
contextually appropriate democratic system that aligned with their national values. 
Though U.S. assistance supported democracy, it did not affect the democratization 
process in the ways portrayed or hoped for by Clinton, Nau, Bush, or Albright. Though 
Ghana gained some aid (both development aid and democracy aid) from Washington, it 
took genuine citizen interest and participation to bring about meaningful rule of law.  
Therefore, Ghanaian agency in advocating for democracy outweighed the U.S. role in the 
whole transition and democracy consolidation process. The country’s political history 
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and experiences, the unfavourable economic conditions of the 1980s, and the long years 
of military rule, marked by long silences in representational decision-making, were all 
impetuses for the democratizing reforms in Ghana in the 1990s.  
 This study provides understanding of the democracy-aid nexus beyond the 
quantitative confines of earlier studies by combining archival and statistical sources to 
explain ways in which aid and democratization were used to complement each other in 
Washington’s relations with the developing world.294 In that sense, it animates 
discussions of aid, democracy and U.S. foreign policy through combining traditional 
aggregate aid volumes, press freedom measures, election data, and trade figures with 
historical evidence from the archives in ways that deepen our knowledge of post-Cold 
War Ghana-U.S. aid relations as well as democratization.  
 As post-election politicking in Ghana showed, elections alone do little to specify 
the sophistication and extent of consolidation of democracy. Elections may mark an 
extrinsic, visual demonstration of political reform but consolidating the rule of law 
requires much more than that. Democratic consolidation demands mass participation and 
ongoing citizen activism to safeguard the vital fruits of a democratic spirit including 
tolerance of minority views, a free press, improved economic livelihood for citizens, and 
truly independent state institutions to safeguard citizen rights. The conspicuity of 
Ghanaian interest groups of all shades and walks of life in post-transition politics and 
governance fostered a sense of responsibility, assurance and involvement befitting a 
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democracy. Citizens’ vigilance over democratic values and constitutional norms from 
infringement by power holders firmed democratic practice, guaranteed a measure of 
independence for state institutions such as the judiciary and media, and expanded the 
opportunity for people to access the political space.  
 The meanings derived from the sources used for this study go a long way to 
deepen our grasp of post-Cold War U.S. foreign aid policy, democracy promotion and the 
role of national ideology in informing American external projections of power. Also, 
based on these sources, we see that though U.S. foreign policy aims in the post-Cold War 
years were multifaceted, security and economic priorities continued to dictate 
Washington’s aid politics towards developing states for both development and democracy 
programmes. Lastly, the sources point us to Ghanaian political enterprise in negotiating 
both foreign aid and external attempts at influencing the nature and pace of political 
reforms in the 1990s. Though Ghanaian benefitted from some American support and 
Western democratic institutional building, the Ghanaian people took leadership of the 
entire transition process and built the new democracy on the unique historical and 
political experience, context and expectations of their country. 
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